2016 Security Jam (Debating Security Plus)

Governments are often criticised for reacting to rather than preparing for predictable crises. Only a few specialised analysts foresaw the Arab Spring, the rise of Daesh and the EU’s massive inCux of refugees. Not only in Europe but worldwide, their reactions were contradictory and even counter-productive. Natural disasters, too, can have a catastrophic global impact. Last year’s COP21 Paris Summit recognised the risks of climate change will exacerbate droughts and increase tensions, while water, food and energy security problems across Asia are paralleled by the demographic explosion in Sub-Saharan Africa.

How can improved early-warning mechanisms be built on information-sharing between intelligence services and crowdsourcing from citizens and social media? “Big data” analytics and the use of artificial intelligence will be important, but the means to access this information are often held privately actors and require much more effective public-private cooperation. The sensitive nature of intelligence makes regional, let alone global, cooperation a distant prospect, so how in practical terms can information sharing be improved? Is the multinational intelligence agency suggested by participants in the 2010 Security Jam feasible?

Can the risk analyses and contingency plans of academics and business analysts be fed into decision-making? What role should business and civil society actors play, and what incentives could encourage better information exchange? Is the 2010 Security Jam’s suggestion for an “International Crisis Preparedness Fund” to finance disaster response and a “scarce resources inventory” to predict future tensions still valid, and if so how could it be made operational? Would overarching security goals, similar to the UN’s MDGs and SDGs, do anything to prepare for future crises?

Moderated by Eurasia Group & Friends of Europe

Governments are all too often at the root of violence, corruption and socio-economic underdevelopment that triggers conCict, radicalisation and the forcible displacement of millions of people. Security sector governance, on the other hand, demands the accountability of security services to the people, with parliamentary oversights and public scrutiny. These are not just problems in developing countries, for the growing confrontation between NATO and Russia now threatens the already fragile global security architecture.

Civil society actors, meanwhile, are able to bridge perception gaps and political divides. The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet recognised the importance of unofficial mediation efforts. But high-level (socalled track I) diplomacy is only effective when supported by tribal or religious authorities’ efforts (track II), and then at grassroots level too (track III). Excluding women from diplomatic processes weakens peace initiatives and also severely limits economic growth.

So how should governments better engage with non-governmental actors? What effects will the (re-)emergence of regional actors like Iran, India and China have on the UN and its Security Council? Can a global consensus be reached on helping failed and failing states recover? How should governments around the world assist eachother’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts? Will new technologies affect reform processes by improving knowledge exchanges? What mechanisms could lessen tensions between NATO and Russia that risk disrupting peace initiatives? What new roles should regional organisations like the EU, NATO, ECOWAS, the OSCE, the African Union or ASEAN be developing, and how can they overcome political hurdles through closer coordination and the development of much-needed joint approaches? Can the on-the-ground knowhow be better used in conflict prevention and postconfliict stabilisation? And how can gender equality and the interests of minorities be ensured?

Moderated by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

Jammers recommended in 2014 the “creation of an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in the Middle East”, but since then the Israel-Palestine conflict has spilled over well beyond the immediate region and the Syrian civil war has killed many thousands and created millions of refugees. The important deal on Iran’s nuclear programme is criticised by some for fear of increased military capability, while tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are heightening the risk of proxy wars escalating into open Sunni- and Shia-led conflicts. Further destabilisation is being caused by the free-fall of oil prices, the establishment of a Kurdish state in parts of Syria and Iraq and growing Western support for Kurdish factions fighting against Daesh.

Can these dynamics be interrupted so that economic development and prosperity are re-established? What are the prospects for a new security architecture, similar to the OSCE, capable of introducing confidence-building measures to the Middle East? Is some sort of “Marshall Plan” for the Middle East feasible, for example to help in the reconstruction of post-conflict Yemen? Do regional bodies like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Arab League offer a basis for ideas like this, and what lessons should other international actors be drawing? What mechanisms could ensure that the nations now militarily involved in Syria reach the consensus needed to avoid an escalating proxy war? With what mandate should members of the international community deploy boots on the ground against Daesh, and is any role emerging for Elder Statesmen, such as those, who achieved the Oslo Accords?

Moderated by the American Security Project

Governments and their electorates around the world are no longer willing to engage in expensive, long-term missions with unclear goals. Maritime missions against piracy in the Gulf of Aden have enjoyed broad support, but the UN Security Council remains divided on the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle and the policy of nonintervention.

The changing nature of peacekeeping is giving rise to a wide range of tasks and capabilities which the military forces do not yet possess, requiring a rethink of the divisions of responsibility between civilian and military missions. Only few countries possess capabilities like aircraft carriers, air-to-air refuelling and high-tech surveillance technology with drones, to embark individually on missions. Joint operations also require military interoperability and strategic agreements on safe zones.

What does this mean in practice for future military and peacekeeping missions? Will the Security Council still be relevant and effective? What future awaits the African Union, the League of Arab States and UN peacekeepers? Given the state of Europe’s defences, what are the prospects for EU member states to increase their defence budgets and revive the EU Battle Groups? Should other regions adopt elements of the EU’s and NATO’s strategies on maritime security and develop similar action plans as part of a larger framework to secure shipping routes? How should nations improve interoperability between their civilian and military missions and make them more efficient and cost-effective, and what role is there for industry in ensuring greater operability? How can a whole-of-government approach ensure that the root causes of conflicts rather than the symptoms are addressed? Is military intervention becoming digital, as with the Stuxnet attacks on Iran, and will future military missions have a strong cyber component? Will drones replace manned aircrafts, and if so, how can civilian lives be better protected? Can the international community address in practical terms the risks of proxy wars and hybrid warfare tactics?

Moderated by The Institute for Strategic Research, Paris

Forces around the world responsible for internal security are under pressure to adapt to new challenges, whether they are border guards responding to refugees or police forces confronted by violent extremists. Organised transnational criminal networks, that deal in anything from weapons to human beings, have the power to destabilise societies and corrupt governments, creating narco-states, like Colombia in the 1980s or Guinea-Bissau today. The destruction of criminal organisations demands national, regional and global cooperation, so what will be required of interior security forces by 2025, and must they adapt? Should they conduct forecasting exercises similar to their defence counterparts and to what extent will regional differences lead to differing roles?

How should cooperation between internal security and defence forces evolve at the strategic, tactical and operational levels? Should the military be deployed to combat traffickers, and what sort of legislative changes could improve international cooperation against organised crime? Can cooperation between NGOs and border guards or agencies such as Frontex be improved to enhance assistance for refugees while hitting human traffickers? How best should unarmed drones be used for border surveillance? Can citizens and civil society organisations aid police work while avoiding vigilantism? What impact will cybercrime have on police forces’ budgets? Must police forces cooperate with the private sector to fight cybercriminals, and with what impact on public liberties?

Moderated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

The rise of Daesh in Syria, Iraq and more recently Libya has had devastating consequences that range from the oppression of local populations to the rise of militant Islamism. The previously unheard-of wealth of the jihadist group, its state-like military capabilities and its attractiveness to the disillusioned worldwide has led to its rapid growth and its geographical spread. Groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia and parts of the so-called “Caucasus Emirate” in Russia have declared their support to Daesh while others – most prominently the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Al-Nusra – are engaged in intense fighting. Terrorist attacks in Paris and Istanbul that happened in spite of early warnings have strengthened criticism of intelligence services across Europe.

To defeat Daesh and others, so as to prevent the spread of violent ideology, military solutions will not be enough. Deterring with the promise of retaliation fails against non-geographical threats, leaving international actors often diametrically opposed over how to respond. What is clear, though, is that socio-economic inclusion and the societal integration of minorities will be crucial in addressing the root causes of radicalisation and preventing disillusioned citizens from joining violent extremist groups.

What lessons can we draw from past and current confrontations with violent extremism, such as the German Red Army Faction, the IRA in Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Afghan Taliban, Hamas in Gaza, the Sri Lankan LTTE or Lashkare-Taiba in Pakistan and India? What are the key commonalities and differences? Can the root causes be addressed through a whole-of-government approach, and how should countries of origin prevent radicalisation and stop their citizens from joining groups fighting abroad? Could governments and businesses provide online services, and especially social media platforms, to counter Daesh’s online propaganda? What is the future for signals intelligence (SIGINT) to replace human spies (HUMINT) in the medium term, and how can citizens’ right to privacy be protected when threats to national security are considered so great? Can Daesh’s Financial support be cut off?

Moderated by the International Strategic Research Organisation

Governments are often criticised for reacting to rather than preparing for predictable crises. Only a few specialised analysts foresaw the Arab Spring, the rise of Daesh and the EU’s massive inCux of refugees. Not only in Europe but worldwide, their reactions were contradictory and even counter-productive. Natural disasters, too, can have a catastrophic global impact. Last year’s COP21 Paris Summit recognised the risks of climate change will exacerbate droughts and increase tensions, while water, food and energy security problems across Asia are paralleled by the demographic explosion in Sub-Saharan Africa.

How can improved early-warning mechanisms be built on information-sharing between intelligence services and crowdsourcing from citizens and social media? “Big data” analytics and the use of artificial intelligence will be important, but the means to access this information are often held privately actors and require much more effective public-private cooperation. The sensitive nature of intelligence makes regional, let alone global, cooperation a distant prospect, so how in practical terms can information sharing be improved? Is the multinational intelligence agency suggested by participants in the 2010 Security Jam feasible?

Can the risk analyses and contingency plans of academics and business analysts be fed into decision-making? What role should business and civil society actors play, and what incentives could encourage better information exchange? Is the 2010 Security Jam’s suggestion for an “International Crisis Preparedness Fund” to finance disaster response and a “scarce resources inventory” to predict future tensions still valid, and if so how could it be made operational? Would overarching security goals, similar to the UN’s MDGs and SDGs, do anything to prepare for future crises?

Moderated by Eurasia Group & Friends of Europe

Governments are all too often at the root of violence, corruption and socio-economic underdevelopment that triggers conCict, radicalisation and the forcible displacement of millions of people. Security sector governance, on the other hand, demands the accountability of security services to the people, with parliamentary oversights and public scrutiny. These are not just problems in developing countries, for the growing confrontation between NATO and Russia now threatens the already fragile global security architecture.

Civil society actors, meanwhile, are able to bridge perception gaps and political divides. The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet recognised the importance of unofficial mediation efforts. But high-level (socalled track I) diplomacy is only effective when supported by tribal or religious authorities’ efforts (track II), and then at grassroots level too (track III). Excluding women from diplomatic processes weakens peace initiatives and also severely limits economic growth.

So how should governments better engage with non-governmental actors? What effects will the (re-)emergence of regional actors like Iran, India and China have on the UN and its Security Council? Can a global consensus be reached on helping failed and failing states recover? How should governments around the world assist eachother’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts? Will new technologies affect reform processes by improving knowledge exchanges? What mechanisms could lessen tensions between NATO and Russia that risk disrupting peace initiatives? What new roles should regional organisations like the EU, NATO, ECOWAS, the OSCE, the African Union or ASEAN be developing, and how can they overcome political hurdles through closer coordination and the development of much-needed joint approaches? Can the on-the-ground knowhow be better used in conflict prevention and postconfliict stabilisation? And how can gender equality and the interests of minorities be ensured?

Moderated by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

Jammers recommended in 2014 the “creation of an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in the Middle East”, but since then the Israel-Palestine conflict has spilled over well beyond the immediate region and the Syrian civil war has killed many thousands and created millions of refugees. The important deal on Iran’s nuclear programme is criticised by some for fear of increased military capability, while tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are heightening the risk of proxy wars escalating into open Sunni- and Shia-led conflicts. Further destabilisation is being caused by the free-fall of oil prices, the establishment of a Kurdish state in parts of Syria and Iraq and growing Western support for Kurdish factions fighting against Daesh.

Can these dynamics be interrupted so that economic development and prosperity are re-established? What are the prospects for a new security architecture, similar to the OSCE, capable of introducing confidence-building measures to the Middle East? Is some sort of “Marshall Plan” for the Middle East feasible, for example to help in the reconstruction of post-conflict Yemen? Do regional bodies like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Arab League offer a basis for ideas like this, and what lessons should other international actors be drawing? What mechanisms could ensure that the nations now militarily involved in Syria reach the consensus needed to avoid an escalating proxy war? With what mandate should members of the international community deploy boots on the ground against Daesh, and is any role emerging for Elder Statesmen, such as those, who achieved the Oslo Accords?

Moderated by the American Security Project

Governments and their electorates around the world are no longer willing to engage in expensive, long-term missions with unclear goals. Maritime missions against piracy in the Gulf of Aden have enjoyed broad support, but the UN Security Council remains divided on the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle and the policy of nonintervention.

The changing nature of peacekeeping is giving rise to a wide range of tasks and capabilities which the military forces do not yet possess, requiring a rethink of the divisions of responsibility between civilian and military missions. Only few countries possess capabilities like aircraft carriers, air-to-air refuelling and high-tech surveillance technology with drones, to embark individually on missions. Joint operations also require military interoperability and strategic agreements on safe zones.

What does this mean in practice for future military and peacekeeping missions? Will the Security Council still be relevant and effective? What future awaits the African Union, the League of Arab States and UN peacekeepers? Given the state of Europe’s defences, what are the prospects for EU member states to increase their defence budgets and revive the EU Battle Groups? Should other regions adopt elements of the EU’s and NATO’s strategies on maritime security and develop similar action plans as part of a larger framework to secure shipping routes? How should nations improve interoperability between their civilian and military missions and make them more efficient and cost-effective, and what role is there for industry in ensuring greater operability? How can a whole-of-government approach ensure that the root causes of conflicts rather than the symptoms are addressed? Is military intervention becoming digital, as with the Stuxnet attacks on Iran, and will future military missions have a strong cyber component? Will drones replace manned aircrafts, and if so, how can civilian lives be better protected? Can the international community address in practical terms the risks of proxy wars and hybrid warfare tactics?

Moderated by The Institute for Strategic Research, Paris

Forces around the world responsible for internal security are under pressure to adapt to new challenges, whether they are border guards responding to refugees or police forces confronted by violent extremists. Organised transnational criminal networks, that deal in anything from weapons to human beings, have the power to destabilise societies and corrupt governments, creating narco-states, like Colombia in the 1980s or Guinea-Bissau today. The destruction of criminal organisations demands national, regional and global cooperation, so what will be required of interior security forces by 2025, and must they adapt? Should they conduct forecasting exercises similar to their defence counterparts and to what extent will regional differences lead to differing roles?

How should cooperation between internal security and defence forces evolve at the strategic, tactical and operational levels? Should the military be deployed to combat traffickers, and what sort of legislative changes could improve international cooperation against organised crime? Can cooperation between NGOs and border guards or agencies such as Frontex be improved to enhance assistance for refugees while hitting human traffickers? How best should unarmed drones be used for border surveillance? Can citizens and civil society organisations aid police work while avoiding vigilantism? What impact will cybercrime have on police forces’ budgets? Must police forces cooperate with the private sector to fight cybercriminals, and with what impact on public liberties?

Moderated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

The rise of Daesh in Syria, Iraq and more recently Libya has had devastating consequences that range from the oppression of local populations to the rise of militant Islamism. The previously unheard-of wealth of the jihadist group, its state-like military capabilities and its attractiveness to the disillusioned worldwide has led to its rapid growth and its geographical spread. Groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia and parts of the so-called “Caucasus Emirate” in Russia have declared their support to Daesh while others – most prominently the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Al-Nusra – are engaged in intense fighting. Terrorist attacks in Paris and Istanbul that happened in spite of early warnings have strengthened criticism of intelligence services across Europe.

To defeat Daesh and others, so as to prevent the spread of violent ideology, military solutions will not be enough. Deterring with the promise of retaliation fails against non-geographical threats, leaving international actors often diametrically opposed over how to respond. What is clear, though, is that socio-economic inclusion and the societal integration of minorities will be crucial in addressing the root causes of radicalisation and preventing disillusioned citizens from joining violent extremist groups.

What lessons can we draw from past and current confrontations with violent extremism, such as the German Red Army Faction, the IRA in Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Afghan Taliban, Hamas in Gaza, the Sri Lankan LTTE or Lashkare-Taiba in Pakistan and India? What are the key commonalities and differences? Can the root causes be addressed through a whole-of-government approach, and how should countries of origin prevent radicalisation and stop their citizens from joining groups fighting abroad? Could governments and businesses provide online services, and especially social media platforms, to counter Daesh’s online propaganda? What is the future for signals intelligence (SIGINT) to replace human spies (HUMINT) in the medium term, and how can citizens’ right to privacy be protected when threats to national security are considered so great? Can Daesh’s Financial support be cut off?

Moderated by the International Strategic Research Organisation

Governments are often criticised for reacting to rather than preparing for predictable crises. Only a few specialised analysts foresaw the Arab Spring, the rise of Daesh and the EU’s massive influx of refugees. Not only in Europe but worldwide, their reactions were contradictory and even counter-productive. Natural disasters, too, can have a catastrophic global impact. Last year’s COP21 Paris Summit recognised the risks of climate change will exacerbate droughts and increase tensions, while water, food and energy security problems across Asia are paralleled by the demographic explosion in Sub-Saharan Africa.

How can improved early-warning mechanisms be built on information-sharing between intelligence services and crowdsourcing from citizens and social media? “Big data” analytics and the use of artificial intelligence will be important, but the means to access this information are often held privately actors and require much more effective public-private cooperation. The sensitive nature of intelligence makes regional, let alone global, cooperation a distant prospect, so how in practical terms can information sharing be improved? Is the multinational intelligence agency suggested by participants in the 2010 Security Jam feasible?

Can the risk analyses and contingency plans of academics and business analysts be fed into decision-making? What role should business and civil society actors play, and what incentives could encourage better information exchange? Is the 2010 Security Jam’s suggestion for an “International Crisis Preparedness Fund” to finance disaster response and a “scarce resources inventory” to predict future tensions still valid, and if so how could it be made operational? Would overarching security goals, similar to the UN’s MDGs and SDGs, do anything to prepare for future crises?

Moderated by Eurasia Group & Friends of Europe

Governments are all too often at the root of violence, corruption and socio-economic underdevelopment that triggers conCict, radicalisation and the forcible displacement of millions of people. Security sector governance, on the other hand, demands the accountability of security services to the people, with parliamentary oversights and public scrutiny. These are not just problems in developing countries, for the growing confrontation between NATO and Russia now threatens the already fragile global security architecture.

Civil society actors, meanwhile, are able to bridge perception gaps and political divides. The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet recognised the importance of unofficial mediation efforts. But high-level (socalled track I) diplomacy is only effective when supported by tribal or religious authorities’ efforts (track II), and then at grassroots level too (track III). Excluding women from diplomatic processes weakens peace initiatives and also severely limits economic growth.

So how should governments better engage with non-governmental actors? What effects will the (re-)emergence of regional actors like Iran, India and China have on the UN and its Security Council? Can a global consensus be reached on helping failed and failing states recover? How should governments around the world assist eachother’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts? Will new technologies affect reform processes by improving knowledge exchanges? What mechanisms could lessen tensions between NATO and Russia that risk disrupting peace initiatives? What new roles should regional organisations like the EU, NATO, ECOWAS, the OSCE, the African Union or ASEAN be developing, and how can they overcome political hurdles through closer coordination and the development of much-needed joint approaches? Can the on-the-ground knowhow be better used in conflict prevention and postconfliict stabilisation? And how can gender equality and the interests of minorities be ensured?

Moderated by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

Jammers recommended in 2014 the “creation of an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in the Middle East”, but since then the Israel-Palestine conflict has spilled over well beyond the immediate region and the Syrian civil war has killed many thousands and created millions of refugees. The important deal on Iran’s nuclear programme is criticised by some for fear of increased military capability, while tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are heightening the risk of proxy wars escalating into open Sunni- and Shia-led conflicts. Further destabilisation is being caused by the free-fall of oil prices, the establishment of a Kurdish state in parts of Syria and Iraq and growing Western support for Kurdish factions fighting against Daesh.

Can these dynamics be interrupted so that economic development and prosperity are re-established? What are the prospects for a new security architecture, similar to the OSCE, capable of introducing confidence-building measures to the Middle East? Is some sort of “Marshall Plan” for the Middle East feasible, for example to help in the reconstruction of post-conflict Yemen? Do regional bodies like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Arab League offer a basis for ideas like this, and what lessons should other international actors be drawing? What mechanisms could ensure that the nations now militarily involved in Syria reach the consensus needed to avoid an escalating proxy war? With what mandate should members of the international community deploy boots on the ground against Daesh, and is any role emerging for Elder Statesmen, such as those, who achieved the Oslo Accords?

Moderated by the American Security Project

Governments and their electorates around the world are no longer willing to engage in expensive, long-term missions with unclear goals. Maritime missions against piracy in the Gulf of Aden have enjoyed broad support, but the UN Security Council remains divided on the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle and the policy of nonintervention.

The changing nature of peacekeeping is giving rise to a wide range of tasks and capabilities which the military forces do not yet possess, requiring a rethink of the divisions of responsibility between civilian and military missions. Only few countries possess capabilities like aircraft carriers, air-to-air refuelling and high-tech surveillance technology with drones, to embark individually on missions. Joint operations also require military interoperability and strategic agreements on safe zones.

What does this mean in practice for future military and peacekeeping missions? Will the Security Council still be relevant and effective? What future awaits the African Union, the League of Arab States and UN peacekeepers? Given the state of Europe’s defences, what are the prospects for EU member states to increase their defence budgets and revive the EU Battle Groups? Should other regions adopt elements of the EU’s and NATO’s strategies on maritime security and develop similar action plans as part of a larger framework to secure shipping routes? How should nations improve interoperability between their civilian and military missions and make them more efficient and cost-effective, and what role is there for industry in ensuring greater operability? How can a whole-of-government approach ensure that the root causes of conflicts rather than the symptoms are addressed? Is military intervention becoming digital, as with the Stuxnet attacks on Iran, and will future military missions have a strong cyber component? Will drones replace manned aircrafts, and if so, how can civilian lives be better protected? Can the international community address in practical terms the risks of proxy wars and hybrid warfare tactics?

Moderated by The Institute for Strategic Research, Paris

The rise of Daesh in Syria, Iraq and more recently Libya has had devastating consequences that range from the oppression of local populations to the rise of militant Islamism. The previously unheard-of wealth of the jihadist group, its state-like military capabilities and its attractiveness to the disillusioned worldwide has led to its rapid growth and its geographical spread. Groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia and parts of the so-called “Caucasus Emirate” in Russia have declared their support to Daesh while others – most prominently the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Al-Nusra – are engaged in intense fighting. Terrorist attacks in Paris and Istanbul that happened in spite of early warnings have strengthened criticism of intelligence services across Europe.

To defeat Daesh and others, so as to prevent the spread of violent ideology, military solutions will not be enough. Deterring with the promise of retaliation fails against non-geographical threats, leaving international actors often diametrically opposed over how to respond. What is clear, though, is that socio-economic inclusion and the societal integration of minorities will be crucial in addressing the root causes of radicalisation and preventing disillusioned citizens from joining violent extremist groups.

What lessons can we draw from past and current confrontations with violent extremism, such as the German Red Army Faction, the IRA in Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Afghan Taliban, Hamas in Gaza, the Sri Lankan LTTE or Lashkare-Taiba in Pakistan and India? What are the key commonalities and differences? Can the root causes be addressed through a whole-of-government approach, and how should countries of origin prevent radicalisation and stop their citizens from joining groups fighting abroad? Could governments and businesses provide online services, and especially social media platforms, to counter Daesh’s online propaganda? What is the future for signals intelligence (SIGINT) to replace human spies (HUMINT) in the medium term, and how can citizens’ right to privacy be protected when threats to national security are considered so great? Can Daesh’s Financial support be cut off?

Moderated by the International Strategic Research Organisation

The 2016 Security Jam, organised by Friends of Europe with a coalition of over 50 partners, convened 48 VIPs and close to 2,500 participants from 131 countries for a massive brainstorm on international security challenges. It created what is arguably the most comprehensive global snapshot of security issues which were featured in an in-depth report discussed with Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders and others at the report launch event on June 30 in Brussels.

The last moments of Security Jam 2016 featured highlighted recommendations from the 4 days of debate.