A federal defence union for Ukraine

In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev pulled back the Soviet Union from central and eastern Europe, a largely unforeseen, dramatic action. Stability was gradually restored over the next 20 years only for those newly independent states that attained membership of NATO and the European Union. Where joining the West was thwarted, notably in Ukraine, instability persisted. Russia itself was left weak and revanchist. The rest of Europe, meanwhile, sharply reduced defence spending.

In 2025, Donald Trump seems to be returning the compliment by pulling back America from western Europe. Another period of continental destabilisation is in process, with the biggest impact again felt in Ukraine, which is fighting to assert its own state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Today, for the first time, Europeans have to consider a future NATO without the US, and have no option but to sharply increase defence spending. Nationalist America risks being left friendless.

The European Commission has issued a White Paper with the lacklustre title “For European Defence Readiness 2030”. The first page of the lengthy document poses the rhetorical question of Europe: “Does it want to muddle through the years ahead, attempting to adapt to new challenges in an incremental and cautious way?”. Presumably the authors intended the answer ‘No’. They can be forgiven for disappointment, therefore, with the outcome of the European Council of 20 March, which called merely for “continued work on the relevant financing options” made possible by the loosening of fiscal rules. A certain lack of conviction was demonstrated when Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had to change the brand of her proposed loan instrument from ‘ReArm Europe’ to – the frankly less reassuring – ‘Readiness 2030’. 2030 feels a long way off, a considerable amount of time to be unready to confront Putin’s depredations.

The white paper is the first fruit of the first ever Commissioner for Defence, Andrius Kubilius, a conservative, if successful, former prime minister of Lithuania and latterly MEP. He has called for a surge in military investment and identified critical capability gaps. The paper explores the several existing instruments and platforms for collaboration, including the European Defence Agency, and the efforts underway to develop a European technological and industrial base for armaments. We are also promised an “omnibus” of regulatory simplification. For Ukraine, the Commission prescribes a strategy of “steel porcupine” paid for largely by the EU and assisted by a ‘coalition of the willing’ being assembled by French President Macron and British Prime Minister Starmer. While we await the emergence of the much-vaunted Trump-Putin ceasefire, however, these strategic goals remain hypothetical. As Bart De Wever, Belgium’s latest Prime Minister, remarked tellingly, “We are willing. But willing to do what exactly?”

Nowhere from the papers and discussions of the last few weeks do we get a concrete idea of what the EU really wants to do about its own defence in the light of the escalating crisis. It is clear that Europe is again set for a long period of instability that would be easier to ride out if we knew where we are aiming. What would help undoubtedly would be for an early meeting of the European Council to make two critical decisions that will define the future of Europe. First, the EU shall become a defence union. Second, Ukraine will join the EU at once.

Common defence

The EU treaty provides for the framing of a common defence policy leading to common defence “when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (Article 42(2) TEU). The Commission’s white paper omits to mention this. Certainly, the political implications of an integrated military force are profound, and they must be aired properly before they can be understood. A union of states that opts to defend itself as a bloc can no longer be a mere confederal alliance. Indeed, it was only when the US had to act as one to fight off the British that it became a truly federal republic.

Already, EU member states have an obligation to aid and assist “by all the means in their power” a fellow member state that falls victim to armed attack (Article 42(7)). The Commission’s white paper omits to mention this too. Passing reference is made to PESCO, special arrangements provided for those politically willing and militarily capable states that wish, within the EU framework, to “establish permanent structured cooperation” in defence (Article 42(6)).

The EU treaties, of course, contain many unfulfilled aspirations towards an ever closer union. The history of European integration is studded with risks taken and mistakes made – none more so than the creation of a single currency without a fiscal union. But for common defence, political commitment has to be total and burden sharing real. A joint military command and control system cannot function if one or more member states subvert strategy or block decisions. Framing a common defence policy implies the existence of a strong federal executive with an EU defence secretary and an EU treasury secretary, fully accountable to a proper European Parliament. The EU defence union will be federal or it will not be.

Viktor Orbán

This brings us to Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s long-serving leader, who now nurses a deep grudge against the EU and stirs the ashes of ultranationalism against what he dubs “the Brusselian empire”. Orbán prides himself on disrespecting the liberal democratic values of the Union as inscribed in Article 2 and takes a cavalier attitude to the rule of EU law. He is antisemitic and homophobic. He restricts freedom of speech. He fails on several counts to cooperate sincerely with his EU partners, in breach of Article 4(3). He openly opposes the EU’s external security policy, contrary to his obligations under Article 24.

Orbán has become an apologist for Putin’s invasion of neighbouring Ukraine, a country that embraces former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He undermines the EU’s efforts to salvage Ukraine by insisting on delaying or diluting sanctions against Russia. This he can do because the European Council needs unanimity to authorise sanctions (Article 24(1)).

So, what should the EU do about Orbán? One option is to try again to mobilise Article 7 that permits the European Council to “determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach” of the values of Article 2 with a view to depriving the offending country of its voting rights in the Council. But deployment of this sanction requires a unanimous vote among all other member states, and Orbán has always been able to rely on the backing of one or another fellow nationalist. Today, his main ally is the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, whose own performance has prompted the irreverent suggestion that Slovakia should be indicted under Article 7 simultaneously with Hungary.

Fast-track Ukraine

An early test case of the Union’s resolve to outwit nationalist opposition is to accelerate Ukraine’s bid to join the EU. EU membership is bound to be an essential part of any Ukrainian ‘peace deal’. While Trump and Putin can block Ukraine’s membership of NATO, neither has a veto on EU enlargement. The Commission is proposing to open and close only two clusters of the accession package in the course of this year. That is too slow. The aim should be to draft the whole accession treaty by the end of 2025, to begin to ratify the treaty once all the chapters are closed, and to complete its ratification in time for the elections to the European Parliament in 2029. In the interim, President Zelensky should be granted full voting rights in EU decision-making on common foreign, security and defence policy – above and beyond the normal courtesy of observer status granted to any acceding country. Ukraine as an EU member state will immediately be part of the vanguard of common defence.

By abstaining at the critical meeting of the European Council in December 2023, Orbán let Ukraine’s accession negotiations begin. No doubt, he was well briefed on the EU’s revised rules of procedure, adopted in 2020, that allow him subsequently to veto the opening and closing of any of the 33 chapters of the enlargement dossier. To make swift progress in admitting Ukraine, therefore, the Union should now scrap the 2020 procedure and return to the letter and spirit of the original treaty that allows for the possibility of a national veto only at the beginning and the end of the enlargement process (Article 49).

Under such a streamlined procedure, the Commission would be able to drive forward the negotiations with Kyiv unless a qualified majority voting can be mustered in the Council to call a halt. A concerted initiative to make such a revision should be made jointly by von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. It can be implemented effectively by the 2025 six-month term presidencies of the Council of Ministers – fortuitously Poland and Denmark. The change will be supported by the European Parliament. Orbán and Fico will make a fuss, but their bluff must be called. It would be grotesque to see these two proud sovereigntists scupper the sovereign decision of Ukraine to join them in the EU.

An encouraging start has been made by the European Council, which, on 6 March, took the unprecedented step of issuing a statement on Ukraine, “firmly supported” by only 26 of its 27 members. A similar course was taken at its meeting last week. What status these pragmatic declarations ‘à vingt-six’ have under EU law is debatable, and may yet be challenged by Hungary at the European Court of Justice. In the meantime, nonetheless, they make a powerful statement of intent that Ukraine is not to be held hostage by Hungary.

Viktor Orbán, hard-pressed, may threaten to leave the Union. While a member state cannot be expelled from the Union, it can be induced to depart in an orderly fashion with an agreed framework for the future relationship in place (Article 50). The United Kingdom famously messed up its own departure. With Brexit in mind, however, one may doubt that the Hungarian electorate will allow Orbán to take the same risk. The next parliamentary elections in Hungary are scheduled as soon as spring 2026.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.