“Aux armes citoyens”: Europe’s defence, like charity, begins at home

In the autumn of 1792, a combined force of Austrians and Prussians under the command of the Duke of Brunswick invaded France with the intention of restoring the deposed Louis XVI to his absolutist throne. At this moment of extreme danger for the French Revolution, the National Assembly in Paris decreed “la levée en masse”. It was the duty of all citizens in a democratic republic to defend the country against counterrevolutionaries from without (and also from within). Many, including the Duke of Brunswick, were initially sceptical that an army of butchers, bakers or candlestick makers would be of much military use against trained, professional infantrymen. But the French rout of the Austrians and Prussians at the Battle of Valmy soon proved them wrong. Motivation and energy in the defence of the homeland (as well as the superior numbers obtained by conscription) neutralised the advantage of practised manoeuvres or disciplined drills on the parade ground. Later, Napoleon, who made massive use of his conscript army to conquer nearly all of Europe, proclaimed that “in war, the moral is to the physical as three to one”. The legacy of the French Revolution was to develop the concept of the ‘active citizen’ as opposed to the ‘passive citizens’ subject to the whims and exactions of the Bourbon monarchy. An active citizen not only participated in politics, local government and civil society but also had the duty to defend the new republic against foreign threats or efforts to undermine the new political order. Instead of being left to a professional army (and frequently in the 18th century, these were made up of mercenaries and foreign adventurers), the defence of democratic polities was the responsibility of the whole of society. Able-bodied men in a given age bracket had to have the basic training and readiness to perform their patriotic duty if and when the call came.

This tradition remained strong, particularly on the political left which distrusted standing professional armies which could easily be captured by right-wing nationalist ideologies and become an isolated caste outside the control of parliamentary politics. A point reflected in Voltaire’s quip that Prussia was not a “state with an army but an army with a state”. Arguably, this tradition continued in Wilhelmine Germany before the First World War, when the Reichstag, despite being dominated for decades by a Social Democratic majority, failed to break the grip that the Kaiser and the army had on the country’s national security decision-making, with tragic consequences for all of Europe when the July Crisis broke out in 1914. France, on the other hand, remained committed to the concept of popular mobilisation and of “L’armée du peuple” as expounded in the famous book of the same name written by the socialist leader, Jean Jaurès, in 1911. An army needed to be embedded in the whole of society and conscription was not just a period of military training, but the means to develop the sense of public duty and individual sacrifice and to overcome social or religious divisions, thereby uniting all classes in a common endeavour to defend the nation. Those not fit or too old for the frontline could serve in the reserves or in rear occupations, while women not eligible to fight could contribute by working in munitions factories or serving as nurses, drivers and auxiliaries. The greater the percentage of the total population involved in the war effort, the greater the chance of coming out on top in the total wars of the 20th century. In turn, as more of the population contributed directly to the defence (and therefore the survival) of the state, the greater the voice of those citizens in demanding the right to have their own priorities for jobs and welfare addressed by governments after the wars had ended. This was a lesson learned painfully by the war hero, Winston Churchill, when he went down to a resounding defeat at the hands of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party in the British election of July 1945. The ‘New Jerusalem’ of social reform and justice was the price of wartime patriotism.

All this reads very much like ancient history to modern generations of European citizens, for whom war has been unthinkable and prolonged peace is the natural state of affairs. Attempts by governments to dragoon them into compulsory military service, let alone send them to the frontline of an actual conflict, would no doubt be resisted, with many refusing outright to serve. As the French sociologist, Bénédicte Charon, recently observed to the Agence France-Presse: “in a liberal society, the imposition of military constraints has become nearly impossible to implement”. That might prove true also of efforts by European governments to impose sanctions, court martials or imprisonment on those refusing the call-up as happened in times gone by. For many contemporary Europeans, war has become profoundly irrational and a failure of diplomacy that can and should prevent conflicts from ever breaking out. Therefore, not their responsibility and not obliging them to defend their country on the battlefield. The reality of all-out war in Ukraine has persuaded hundreds of thousands of military-age Ukrainian men to escape the country, often using bribes to avoid military service, a fact that explains the shortage of troops that Ukraine is now experiencing in the fighting in Donetsk. In Europe too, the military profession does not hold the attraction that it had for previous generations, lured by adventure, the quest for social prestige or keen to escape poverty and unemployment. Countries like France and the United Kingdom have had difficulty recruiting and retaining soldiers despite offering pay increases, re-enlistment bonuses and better housing. Slick TV advertising campaigns extolling the life-enhancing benefits and camaraderie of military service have had only a limited effect. Germany, too, has remained several thousand soldiers below its ceiling for the Bundeswehr of 220,000 (it is currently at 180,000).

But could all this be about to change and is history making a comeback? The war in Ukraine has caused Europeans to suddenly feel vulnerable by bringing prolonged and devastating conflict back to their continent. By extension, the war has increased the threat to Europe’s own security; and the Russian army that emerges from it, despite many tactical mistakes and enormous losses in men and materiel, will be a far stronger and more efficient fighting machine than the one with which Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. If the United States remains engaged in NATO and keeps its forces and nuclear deterrence in Europe, the Europeans would most probably prevail in a war against Russia, especially in the air, if not immediately on land. But, if the US reduces that military commitment or removes it altogether, the Europeans would face the reality that most of their armies, too small and poorly equipped, would not be able to stand up to a Russian onslaught – at least not for several years given the current pace of European rearmament. Although Europe currently has 1.47mn active duty soldiers, a recent study by the Kiel Institute and Bruegel concludes that Europe will need 300,000 more soldiers to have a proper war-fighting capability. If several thousand European soldiers need to be deployed to Ukraine shortly to implement a ceasefire and to give Kyiv the security guarantees that it has insisted on, that number would be even larger, although it can be argued that European troops defending Ukraine are also securing NATO territory elsewhere in Eastern Europe. These increases are hardly likely unless most European countries reintroduce conscription and in a meaningful way as all the new equipment and weapons that the EU is now proposing to produce through its Defence Industry Programme and Industrial Development initiative, and €150bn SAFE investment fund, will need trained soldiers to operate and maintain. Something longer, better organised and more rigorous than the six-month programmes of civic service with which many European countries replaced their former conscription schemes, will be needed. Conscious that we are now living in a more dangerous world and different times, European public opinion seems to be moving in this direction. A recent YouGov poll found that 68% of those surveyed in France, and 58% in Germany, favoured compulsory military service. People in the UK and Italy were fairly evenly divided, whereas 53% of Spaniards were opposed.

When the Cold War came to an end at the beginning of the 1990s, most European countries phased out military service or reduced its length and scope to levels where the costs outweighed the societal benefits. But nine countries retained military service: Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Norway and Türkiye. Others kept it for a while, as their defence concepts were traditionally based on large territorial armies with major reserve forces that relied heavily on conscripts, but suspended compulsory military service eventually. This was the case with France in 2001, Poland in 2008 and Germany in 2011. The UK had exited conscription and opted for a volunteer army much earlier, after the fiasco of the Suez expedition in 1956 with the last conscripted soldier being demobilised in 1963. As the French military historian, Michel Goya, has pointed out, the military commands in these countries found that they were devoting a lot of resources and valuable personnel to running training centres and logistics chains for conscripts who were not around for long enough to gain any serious military skills and experience. President Macron has also given this as the reason why he is not currently planning to reintroduce compulsory military service in France, despite his inclination to have some kind of voluntary training programme. This sentiment is echoed by other European leaders. The anticipated German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has expressed his support for a compulsory one-year scheme of national service – either military or civil – for young German males. Meanwhile, Poland recently announced a plan to offer military training to 100,000 male citizens every year on a voluntary basis, starting in 2027. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that the government would develop “motivations and incentives”. Yet, other countries have gone much further and reintroduced compulsory military service in view of the deteriorating security situation in their vicinity. This was the case with Lithuania in 2015, Sweden in 2017 and Latvia in 2023, demonstrating once more that total defence concepts are easier to implement in northern and eastern Europe than in southern and western Europe. The issue here is that the five biggest European military spenders, and therefore the ones whose decisions make the biggest impact on European defence, are not planning to introduce compulsory military service at the present time, even if they are for the most part committed to significant increases in their defence budgets. They are the UK, France, Poland, Germany and Italy. As Pat McFadden, the head of the Cabinet Office in the UK government, recently told the BBC, the political as well as the economic costs are simply too daunting for governments (already faced with sluggish growth, tax rises and welfare cuts) to take on at the present time. Convincing citizens to accept the diversion of health, social care and foreign aid budgets into armaments production is more than enough of a challenge.

Yet, if our citizens are being asked to make economic sacrifices to their living standards to preserve Europe’s freedoms and security, the task will be easier in the long run if they are brought fully into this effort and feel that they have a role to play and a personal responsibility for its success. The point of national service is to prepare citizens and societies to face future contingencies rather than to respond belatedly to conflicts that have already broken out. And, if the multiple warnings from defence ministers and military commanders about a possible war with Russia within three to five years are to be taken seriously, that effort of preparation needs to start now. Citizens who believe that they are not just going through the motions of national service as a bureaucratic exercise but are being trained for a serious defence strategy with a good chance of success are much more likely to invest seriously in it. Confidence breeds confidence. In the past, it was through one or two-year national service that many European armies obtained their long-term volunteer professional soldiers. Resilience in European security involves an enormous range of tasks, from coping with cyberattacks, sabotage, technical disruptions and disinformation campaigns on the home front to shooting at the enemy or operating drones in the front line. Different people will have different skills, aptitudes and experience for different jobs and roles, thereby increasing the age range from which national service volunteers can be recruited. The concept of reserve forces for retiring soldiers can also be overhauled to ensure that former soldiers with operational, organisational and logistical expertise are put in key positions in a national service structure and work more with other government agencies and the private sector. National service needs to be designed to mobilise trained and motivated individuals who can cover the full spectrum of threats facing Europe from A to Z, while networking effectively with all the other individuals and communities needed to accomplish their particular range of tasks. Designing national service programmes is not an EU role as defence remains a national responsibility. Each European country has its own traditions and particular set of challenges, even if there is a large common denominator among them. But what the EU can do as part of its programme leading towards a defence union is to initiate a debate on the merits of national service schemes in all member states and how these can complement and reinforce the EU’s own common military capability investments and internal resilience measures. In this way, the EU could offer a skills and capabilities requirements matrix to member states – and defence partners like the UK, Canada and Norway – to guide national efforts and adapt them to EU gaps and priorities. The Commission could furthermore carry out annual assessments of the state and quality of national service programmes in member states, similar to its periodic review (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, CARD) of their military equipment and defence plans and use this annual review to highlight best practices and make recommendations. EU teams could visit national service administrations and participate in training and exercises to link national procedures to EU responses.

The starting point is to encourage all member states to draw up a national registration of male and female citizens in a given age bracket. The registration should give their potential skills and work experience as well as contact details. Questionnaires every three or four years should ask recipients to update their personal information, including health conditions, and indicate availability and willingness for training and exercises, particularly at weekends. The EU needs to study in particular the experience of Finland in maintaining a large annual conscription intake and reserve force at high levels of readiness, including women as well as men. A second registration list should cover people in leadership positions, such as CEOs, police commanders, heads of NGOs and senior managers, who with their organisational skills can be deployed to run national resilience and resistance strategies in wartime.

Second, and along the lines of what President Macron, Prime Minister Tusk and the impending Chancellor Merz have proposed, the Commission could encourage member states to establish national service voluntary programmes, with options for either military or civil service and targets for participation for each member state. The administrative costs of training centres and exercises could be financed collectively (at least in part) from the investment funds and deficit financing agreed by the Council, particularly if member states set up bilateral schemes and facilities, as France and Germany, or Poland and the Baltic States, or Finland could easily do. As mentioned, the major challenge will be to convince EU citizens to volunteer for national service especially at a time when vocal and pro-Russian populist parties will no doubt declare that all this activity is wasteful militarism. So, a gradualist step-by-step approach backed up by a highly professional promotion campaign in the media will be needed. The Commission can certainly help with financing and developing the message of European security and solidarity here although, as always with communication, there is no one-size-fits-all solution and sensitivity to national contexts is always crucial. The private sector, trade unions and educational establishments need to be brought in and show a willingness to cooperate too. For instance, in Switzerland, company employees are given leave to perform their national service duties without losing their jobs or suffering career penalties.

Finally, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. National service programmes have to produce the goods in terms of enabling future generations of citizens to develop leadership skills and to step quickly and easily into meaningful wartime roles. The trainees need to form communities of interest and trusted partnerships that they can draw on when mobilising for real wartime operations. This will be expensive and governments will need to build creatively on similar or relevant training programmes already run by private companies and the educational sector. Army open days and air shows are useful to bring young people closer to the armed forces and their mission. The training has to be action-orientated, realistic and relevant, and entrusted to real professionals with the stature to be motivating. Refresher courses and upgrades will need to be on offer too. In the past, national service was often conducted by the second rate whose military careers had come to an end and was focused too much on ‘giving wayward youths a dose of good old military discipline’ rather than taking them to a new level of skill and readiness. So, a willingness to study and learn from those who do it well and to match targets and results with resources will be key. The experience with Europe’s military reserves, often underfunded and neglected, has not been promising in this connection. But the more dangerous geopolitical context has injected a degree of urgency that was lacking before. Yet, there are benefits to be gained. An effective civil response force trained and organised locally and with disaster response and medical assistance capabilities can take a lot of pressure off the armed forces in dealing with emergencies and extreme weather events or critical infrastructure failures.

John F. Kennedy was fond of telling his fellow countrymen: “ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.” Europe is in a similar situation today, in which its freedom and way of life can no longer be taken for granted. The EU and NATO have given nearly half a billion Europeans several generations of peace and prosperity. It would have been wonderful for Europe to buck the historical trend and enjoy this situation for decades to come. But this is not what has happened. The French preserved their Revolution in 1792 by rallying their citizens to defend the new First Republic and keep the hope of ‘Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité’ alive. They did so again in 1830 and 1848. But the French soon discovered, as did the US during its civil war in the 1860s, that their greatest enemy was not a foreign army but their own internal divisions and polarisation. The eventual successor of the First Republic, the Third Republic, in May and June 1940, was unable to overcome a widespread popular mood of cynicism, corruption and defeatism that led to France folding in six weeks to the German invasion, despite having an army that was the equal of its opponent, at least in numbers and equipment. In the Second World War, the allies, including the Soviet Union, mobilised a much larger proportion of their populations and societies than Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy or Tojo’s Japan. The lesson of history is that countries and political systems survive best when ‘active citizens’ are willing and able to defend their homelands and their values and can hold up to setbacks, occasional defeats and constant pressure. Armaments production is vital but the ability and willingness to use those instruments is even more important. Ultimately, it is the human factor that makes the difference. Getting the maximum out of its considerable human capital is the key task to which Europe’s leaders must now address themselves.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.