Farewell Joe Biden: the last Atlanticist President

The decision of Joe Biden last Sunday to drop out of the United States presidential race and to endorse his Vice President, Kamala Harris, was greeted with relief by Democrats and many moderate and undecided voters in the US elections in November, as well as by most of the leaders of US allies, even if they did not say it openly. Since Biden’s disastrous debate performance against Donald Trump in Atlanta last month, the President had struggled to demonstrate that the debate was just a ‘bad night’ for him, and that he was still mentally and physically fit, not just for a gruelling campaign against Trump in the autumn, but also to occupy the White House effectively for another four years. Biden had tried in a major CNN interview, at campaign rallies and at the NATO summit in Washington two weeks ago to convince the American public that he was not experiencing sharp cognitive decline; but these attempts were not entirely convincing. He called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “President Putin” in a post-summit press conference and confused Kamala Harris with Trump. He then had to pause his campaign and return home to Delaware because he came down with COVID-19, leaving the Republicans to monopolise media attention for the best part of a week during their highly vociferous National Convention in Milwaukee. Trump made a triumphant appearance after the failed assassination attempt on his life and demonstrated that he now has the Republican Party firmly in his grasp. He received lots of attention through his nomination of Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio as his Vice Presidential running mate. Vance was once highly critical of Trump but has now fallen into line in support of the former president, as has Nikki Haley, the last Republican presidential hopeful to stay in the race against Trump during the primaries. The Republicans are now more united than they have been in decades, even if the policies that they would actually implement once in power remain the subject of much speculation.

Although Biden is seen by Democrats as a successful President and is well liked in Democratic circles after his 40 years in the Senate and four years as Vice President to Obama, senior party figures were in a panic after his faltering debate performance. Voters, even among Democrats, had long been telling pollsters that at 81 Biden was too old to be President. A majority did not want a rematch between Biden and Trump (79) in November, but new faces from a younger generation. After the debate, the national polls, which for a long time had been showing Biden and Trump neck and neck or even given Biden a small two to three point lead, began to move in Trump’s favour. This was especially true in the closely watched ‘swing states’ – such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Arizona, Georgia and South Carolina – which are still in play between Democrats and Republicans. The votes in these states determine who gets the majority in the Electoral College, made up of delegates from each state. This person becomes US President even if he or she comes second in the national popular vote – an anomaly of US politics that dates back to the 18th century constitution. This was the case with Trump versus Hillary Clinton in 2016. In 2020, Biden had won in many of these ‘swing states’, albeit by tiny margins such as just 10,000 votes in Arizona, and this gave him the keys to the White House. But in the last three weeks polls have showed Trump pulling decisively ahead in the ‘swing states’ by a margin of six to eight points, too big a gap for the Democrats to make up. Democratic senators and representatives began to fear that they would lose their seats as well and lose control of the Senate – won back during the midterm elections of 2022 – to the Republicans. Donations to the Democratic National Committee and to Democrat candidates from wealthy businessmen and the general public were put on hold as donors lost belief that the party could win the elections. A few days before Biden dropped out of the race about a third of Democratic congressmen and women had called on the President to stand down for the sake of the party and the country and to avoid handing the presidency to Trump on a plate. These figures included Biden’s former boss, Barack Obama, the former House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi and the Senate Majority leader, Chuck Schumer, who visited Biden at home in Delaware last Saturday armed with the latest polling evidence showing support for Biden collapsing fast. As Biden himself has characterised the November elections as existential for the US in terms of blocking Trump from subverting American democracy and the rights of individuals, particularly in areas such as abortion, migration and asylum, and education, it was well-nigh impossible for the President to stay in the race if his claim that “I am the one person who can beat Donald Trump and save America” no longer ran true. The longer Biden took to make his decision, the more divided and in chaos the Democrats appeared to be. If Biden had held on until after the summer, the damage would have been permanent and it would have been far too late for the party to choose another candidate and organise an effective campaign. As it is, there are just 16 weeks to go before polling day and Democrats believe that they still have time to recover and turn the situation around.

Vice President Kamala Harris clearly anticipated that Biden would be forced out of the race. The day after he withdrew and endorsed her, the Harris campaign machinery was in full swing. She had received $81mn in campaign contributions in just 24 hours and had picked up over 50% of the available Democratic state delegates, making her formal nomination as the candidate for President inevitable. One hundred thousand voters wrote checks for less than $20, showing that Harris has grass roots support. Nearly $200mn was committed to her Super Political Action Committee. Harris may have not been the first choice of many Democrats. Some preferred more charismatic personalities like Governors Gavin Newsom of California or Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan who have more national recognition. Others wanted mini-primaries to allow ambitious hopefuls to compete and see who would be the strongest candidate. This might have been a more legitimate process but for this to happen, Biden would have needed to announce his withdrawal at least a year ago. Now there isn’t time for the Democrats to continue to argue among themselves. Given the unity among Republicans, they need to draw together quickly and turn the political debate back on Trump, his criminal record and the threat he poses to US democracy. Harris, who can inherit Biden’s campaign war chest ($50mn) and take over his committed delegates, is the only option for a rapid solution. She also has the advantage of being in the White House and using it as a platform to appear ‘presidential’,  as she did during a reception for young American athletes on Monday. So, no one so far has come forward to challenge her and she should be nominated in a virtual roll call vote at the beginning of August, ahead of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago later in the month. Harris can then select her Vice Presidential candidate, presumably a white male governor from a swing state who can help her win that state as well as appeal to moderate, non-committed voters who may be wary of voting for a black, female president. White non-college educated males, worried about losing their jobs and social status, have been a particular bedrock of Trump’s support.

But at the same time, Harris has real political momentum. It’s not a matter of the ‘lesser evil’. Women appreciate her ethnic background (Indian mother and Irish-Jamaican father) and her campaign against laws in states restricting abortion. Young Americans are happy to see a younger candidate and were lukewarm about Biden because of his support for Israel during the Gaza conflict and inability (or unwillingness) to get the Israelis to stop their offensive in Gaza. Harris has been more critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza and stayed away from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address to the US Congress on Wednesday. Democrats like her background as a prosecutor and former Attorney General of California and hope her legal skills will allow her to put Trump on the defensive. Harris’s sudden surge has put the Republicans on the back foot. They were planning to have Biden as their opponent and have spent a small fortune on attack advertising aimed at the current President. They were counting on Biden to be their major campaign asset by making further gaffes and showing his age on the campaign trail. Harris by contrast is level with Trump in the opinion polls and it is difficult for Trump or Vance to attack her (and insult her) without appearing misogynist and alienating women voters. They have to rethink their campaign strategy but it is difficult for them to do so before Harris has been formally nominated and outlined her key policy priorities at the Democratic National Convention. The Republicans will look for any irregularities in Harris’s nomination procedure to claim that her candidacy is illegal and launch court cases. They have already made noises about seeking compensation for the money they have invested in their campaign against Biden thus far. Republicans will also argue that if Biden is unable to serve as President for the next four years due to cognitive disabilities, he must be unfit to continue as President for the next six months and should resign immediately. But none of these challenges are likely to carry much weight. Investors in the US economy, who a few days ago were banking on a Trump victory, will now hold back because of the uncertainty. For instance, Trump had promised to support the oil and gas industry – despite climate change regulations – and to build lots more prisons to hold illegal migrants. These bets no longer look so safe.

The key questions now are:

• Can Kamala Harris win?
• What are the consequences of all this turbulence in American politics for the transatlantic security relationship?

To take question one first.

Biden’s withdrawal has definitely given the Democrats a boost and a new belief in themselves after their near-death experience. Keeping the White House, and a majority in the Senate or regaining control of the House of Representatives, are no longer mission impossible. Harris is a credible candidate and an experienced politician who can unite the party and re-engage it with core Democratic voters: Black people who were gravitating to Trump, unionised labour (also courted by Trump), women and young liberal professionals. But beating Trump and the Republicans will still be an uphill struggle. How will Harris appeal to Hispanic people, who tend to split between Democrats, on migration from Latin America, and Republicans, on conservative family values? Will she carry the older middle class voters that Biden, with his roots in Scranton, Pennsylvania, was able to rally? American politics is a brutal, unforgiving business and Republicans will turn the heat on Harris who after all is not a newcomer but a core part of the Biden Administration over the past four years. She may take the credit for Biden’s social care policies and support for affordable health care but can she avoid criticism for the high inflation rate, which has alienated many poor Americans from the Democrats? As said, she will get support on abortion rights where she has campaigned well, but not on the Mexican border and illegal migration, a specific portfolio she was given by Biden but where she has had little impact. Naturally, like any politician who has been around for a while, Harris has her share of gaffes and ‘skeletons in the cupboard’, which the Republicans will do their best to exploit. Trump is the master of personal attacks and prefers these to discussing policy or social issues where he is clearly uncomfortable. But what applies to Harris also applies in spades to Trump who has his chequered past as well, replete with scandals, court appearances, falsehoods and broken promises. So, the campaign will probably boil down to who will be most successful at keeping the spotlight on the failures and weaknesses of the other – and for the longest time. Meanwhile, Biden has six months still in office to talk up his economic achievements and give Harris a boost: the strong dollar, lower interest rates, record employment and strong growth and productivity. The key issue is whether these macro-statistics can cut through to the average voter, who still feels that life is becoming more expensive and that more tariffs and trade barriers coupled to fewer migrants would somehow protect his or her living standards. Moreover, can Harris convince Americans that she would be a competent commander in chief, a safe pair of hands in a crisis situation? Some observers doubt that the US is ready to elect a black American woman although a black man, Barack Obama, was elected twice just a decade ago. Others believe that the country is ready and that Harris will crystallise this optimism in the multi-racial American dream. She has had a promising start but needs to build and sustain the momentum for the 16 weeks of campaigning ahead. The Democrats traditionally have more problems mobilising their base voters than the Republicans. The latter will try to portray Harris as left-wing and unpatriotic, so she has to firmly occupy the centre ground. Her challenge will be to win over the ‘light Trump voters’, moderates who harbour doubts about Trump and his agenda but who were put off by Biden’s stuttering performances and sense of being out of touch.

In conclusion, Biden’s withdrawal will now make the election a real contest. The danger here is that if Trump again loses, especially by a narrow margin, he will probably claim that he really won, was cheated of victory, and we may see violence on American streets and paralysis in Washington.

Now for question two: the impact on foreign policy and especially the transatlantic relationship.

As can be imagined, European leaders have greeted Biden’s withdrawal with a mixture of relief and regret. Biden is liked in NATO and EU circles as a committed Atlanticist who believes in the virtues of American power and the need for the US to invest in allies and partnerships. He has increased US forces in Europe, backed the enlargement of NATO to Finland and Sweden, healed transatlantic trade and technology disputes and devoted $107bn of US money to weapons and assistance for Ukraine. But more importantly, Biden is the last true Atlanticist in the White House. As a politician for over half a century, and part of the post-World War Two generation, he has spent decades travelling to Europe and attending transatlantic gatherings like the Munich Security Conference. NATO is part of his political DNA. He knows everyone in the European security community and everyone knows him. Of course, Biden could only have been in the White House for another four years until he had to retire and the baton of US leadership passed to a different generation, less connected to Europe and with a different mindset and style. But given all the uncertainties of the war in Ukraine, political instability in Europe in the wake of the surge of far-right and far-left populists and the geopolitical alignment of Russia and China, NATO and EU leaders would still have been happy to have a ‘Biden bonus’ of continuity in the White House. Harris, of course, is more predictable than Trump and more likely to steer a liberal internationalist course. Yet she is less likely to devote so much time to Europe and foreign policy and to travel to Europe so often. She is less likely to maintain the same intimate relationships and friendships with European leaders. So, things will not be quite the same.

At a meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday, ministers noted Biden’s decision while not wanting to greet it too enthusiastically out of respect for the outgoing President. They wished Kamala Harris all the best while being careful not to side too openly with the Democrats for fear of upsetting Trump at a time when the US election is very much in the balance. The line from many foreign ministers is that we need to be ready to work with whoever emerges victorious in November. The Latvian Foreign Affairs Minister, Baiba Braže, even pointed out that although Trump had criticised NATO, he had actually increased the US military spending on troops and infrastructure in Eastern Europe. But German Foreign Affairs Minister, Annalena Baerbock, summed up the mood best when she said that the lesson for Europe from recent political developments in the US is that Europe will need to become less reliant on the US and step up its own defence cooperation, a process considerably accelerated since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Even with Biden in the White House, deadlock in Congress meant that military assistance to Ukraine was held up for six months. If Harris wins, the Democrats may not have control of Congress and US politics will not suddenly become bipartisan and internationalist. Extreme polarisation will remain the name of the game. The America First tendency and sense that the country needs to solve its security problems at home before it ventures abroad will remain powerful and in both major parties. A Harris victory in November will give Europeans more time and breathing space to make the transition to greater self-reliance but it will not reverse the process.

In the meantime, the new president does not take office until 20 January, giving Biden still six months to complete his term. The US will try to use this time to shore up the US position on the global stage as much as possible. Next week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin travel to Asia for the ASEAN meeting in Laos. They will not heed Trump’s warnings to Taiwan to spend more on defence or risk losing US support. They will visit Japan to inaugurate a new US military command structure in the country linked to the new Japanese Joint Command. Agreements on joint weapons production are due to be concluded as well. Washington will pursue the new triangular defence relationship with South Korea and Japan. On the margins of the NATO Summit in Washington, the Pentagon signed an agreement with Seoul to pre-designate certain of its nuclear and conventional weapons to the defence of South Korea. Biden will also seek to step up cooperation with Australia under the AUKUS pact after cooperation between Canberra and Washington on the procurement of nuclear powered submarines has been held up by a series of legal, industrial and bureaucratic delays. But Blinken will also meet Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, in Laos in a further effort to calm the relationship with Beijing. In Europe the US will work hard with the NATO allies to establish the new coordination command for Ukraine weapons deliveries at Wiesbaden – due to become operational in September. Biden will probably give the Ukrainians more authority to use US-supplied drones and missiles against military targets deep inside Russia. The US will work with the new EU leadership now that Ursula von der Leyen has been confirmed by the European Parliament to ramp up economic and financial sanctions against the Kremlin and to show some concrete results from the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. All these steps may not exactly ‘Trump proof’ US multilateral alliances from future actions by a President Trump to withdraw financial or military support, but by creating as many new faits accomplis as possible between now and January, Biden will certainly strive to make his foreign policy legacy more secure and durable.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.