Germany is searching for answers, and the world is watching

Germany is days away from its federal election and the mood in Germany has shifted. Nearly half of Germans are worried about the political future, the business community remain pessimistic about Germany’s prospects and Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) could become the second-largest party in Germany. The sense of uncertainty and fear is in the air, and the question is whether Germany is ready to shift gears.

The answer is, so far, no. Germany faces multiple crises – economic, geopolitical and domestic; and its foreign policy reflects the same paralysis. Since reunification, Germany has anchored itself diplomatically as a European frontrunner, a transatlantic partner and a champion of the rule-based order. Today, its identity is in crisis.

But this moment requires more clarity, which neither the political class nor this election is providing. One look into the election manifestos of Germany’s parties indicates that this discussion has not been fully grasped. None of the proposals have a strategic focus, nor are any grounded in economic feasibility. They fail to inspire confidence in the new challenges that Germany will face. The world, and especially its partners, is relying on Germany, but it remains caught in internal debates. The real discussion is about Germany’s identity and what it should become. I argue that we do not need to look very far.

Historical responsibility

Germany’s interaction with the world is marked by ‘never forget and never repeat’. Our historical responsibility, rooted in the crimes of the Nazi regime and the horrors of the Second World War, requires us to safeguard against the root causes of such hatred. Since reunification, Germany has translated this responsibility into a steadfast commitment to international law and values.

This commitment remains vital. While some voices argue that we should move beyond Germany’s historical accountability, we must reject this notion and instead embrace a reflective approach that continues to define our foreign policy. Germany’s responsibility is not a hindrance but is rather the platform for our engagement and construction of a world of peace.

However, this responsibility is not without its complexities. German foreign policy has tried to balance two interpretations of its historical accountability. The first is the Holocaust and the responsibility towards the Jewish community and by extension the State of Israel. The other is a commitment to human rights, international law and a rule-based global order.[1] These interpretations, especially in light of the current geopolitical environment, have created tension. But the answer is rooted in the principles of our historical responsibilities to a) have open public discourse, b) continue our commitment to human rights and c) remain critical of our past and present.

This commitment is increasingly vital in the current global landscape. The rise of authoritarian regimes is concerning, and the number of refugees has surged, tripling over the past decade according to UNHCR. Additionally, we face the challenge of seeking to expand their territory at the expense of local populations. Whilst being steadfast in our commitment, these developments are not airborne, but we also must recognise the imperfections that have led to the crises we face. One such flaw is that Germany’s reflection on its past should not end with the Nazi era. Our often-overlooked colonial history and Europe’s broader legacy in its relationships with neighbouring regions must also be part of this discourse. Acknowledging and addressing these Western double standards will strengthen Germany’s credibility as a responsible actor on the global stage. This will lead to a better commitment to international law and enhance it if we take the reflections and turn them into reform.

Thus, Germany needs to continue placing its historical responsibility and reflection into its foreign policy, but also, more precisely, to continue to turn this reflection into principles of action. Germany should deepen its engagement with international institutions and support international law and its courts in all matters to uphold the global justice system.

Civilian power

Interconnected to its historical responsibility is Germany’s foreign policy role as a civilian power – one that prioritises diplomacy, economic strength and international cooperation over military intervention. This has also been largely symbolic of the global world order, especially after the Cold War, when this type of actor had a more favourable environment. However, as Zeitenwende has made clear, Germany must now confront the illusion of what civilian power means, and what is required in today’s geopolitical landscape.

Firstly, the assumption that Germany had pursued a nonmilitary approach to international relations before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine is misleading. For over a decade, Germany has been the fifth largest exporter of global arms. It has participated in civilian and military missions, with the ‘historic break’ in the NATO mission in Kosovo in the late 1990s. More so, as a NATO member, Germany has embedded and constructed its military around a collective security arrangement. The Zeitenwende was not a sudden shift, but the outcome of a long transition by an actor that harbours its civilian approach in an environment that increasingly demanded different priorities.

Secondly, Germans and the civilian power concept assume that we have been living in a fundamentally peaceful world, or at least were heading towards it. As German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock remarked on the day of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany “woke up in a different world”. But as Andreas Rödder argues, it was not the world that changed, but Germany that awoke from “their dream of a rules-based, soft power reality…”.[2] Since the turn of the century, the world has witnessed the invasion of Crimea in 2014, world hunger that has been on the rise since 2015 and the rise of extremism outside, but also within, Germany.

Thus, Germany’s civilian power concept is not only debunked but also needs to be recalibrated, but this requires a strategy. The election manifestos of major political parties in the run-up to the election do not capture this urgency. Neither does the prospect of a coalition with the leading centre-right CDU/CSU parties. I would argue that major foreign policy will remain the same whichever coalition, as the habits of compromise and cooperation of parties have been broken (and this did not start with the previous government). Germany is at risk of not taking the strategic pivot it needs seriously.

Germany should develop a coherent strategic foreign policy that does not divert from its identity but strategically anchors it in the ever-changing environment. This means focusing on crisis preparedness and risk management, prioritising civilian prevention measures and managing multiple crises with multiple new players. For example, Germany could highlight small arms and light weapons or restrictions in addressing greenhouse emissions in the defence industry, thus becoming the true civilian power, it could be. If not, the influence of Germany, and Europe, will dwindle.

Thirdly, another assumption is that the public is at odds with the political class with German foreign policy. Despite the increasing popularity of the AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, BSW) – respectively extreme right and left parties – the average German supports increased military expenditure,[3] and continues to assist Ukraine.[4] The most popular politician in recent months has been Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, recognised for his candid and pragmatic approach. All this suggests a country that is open to discussing security policies but also demanding clarity and answers. A population that understands the new environment but wishes Germany to remain a civilian power.

This foreign policy identity is possible if a strengthened political leadership addresses domestic political fragmentation by fostering a cross-party consensus on key foreign policy issues (without the AfD); especially on sensitive and heightened topics such as migration. Thus, it needs to focus on strategic communication to effectively inform the public of Germany’s demands and what it means to be a civilian power in today’s world.

European

The strategy should recognise Germany as a longstanding partner in the European project. As a net financial contributor, a vocal advocate for enlargement and a central player in EU decision-making, its economic strength has been instrumental in shaping the European project. However, security has often been left to Europe’s longest-standing ally, the United States. In a shifting global order, what should Germany’s next steps be? The answer is clear: more Europe.

Despite its deep ties to the EU, Germany has never fully committed. Germany is seen as a reluctant player that is primarily influential due to its economic power. The previous troubled coalition government made infrequent visits to Brussels, distanced themselves from EU reforms such as the Draghi report and resisted initiatives that required considerable action. Again, the illusion of the Merkel era, especially in light of her recent book tour, shows this is not new.

This is not to say that Germany is not an active European player. Notably, in being the largest contributor in absolute terms of Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction, and in shaping the EU’s trading policy. However, Germany’s actions were comfortable, rather than pressing for changes and risking for its partners. This pattern extends to its broader foreign policy, which relies on US security guarantees whilst following Washington’s lead on international affairs. In case last week’s Munich Security Conference was not enough of an indicator, a proactive Europe is necessary for the security of allies that share its values, such as Ukraine.

It is precisely risk, change, innovation and commitment that have propelled European integration forward in the past, and we need more of it. Germany’s path is to embrace its European identity. This means encouraging more European solutions, which requires greater engagement and commitment to compromise. Key relations must be balanced by securing existing relations with renewed energy (France and Poland), spearheading opportunities with the British and seeking new avenues for growing engaged Europeans (Estonia, Denmark).  And what does Europe need? A clear strategy; a coherent approach to China, to the transatlantic relationship and most importantly to the future of Ukraine. These are answers and demands that Germany requires, and to which it can find the right answer with and only with Europe.

Despite the urgency for a more decisive and committed Germany, this election reflects persistent uncertainty. Rather than forging a unified foreign policy rooted in Germany’s evolving identity and the current geopolitical landscape, the democratic centre remains divided. As a result, the German electorate may increasingly turn to parties that challenge the very foundations of modern Germany’s identity.

[1] Pardon, A. (2024, September 23). German guilt in the context of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. The Grimshaw Review of International Affairs. https://grimshawreview.lse.ac.uk/articles/9

[2] Rödder, A. (2024, August 9). Has Germany had a foreign policy “Turning point”? GIS Reports.https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zeitenwende-german-foreign-policy/

[3] ISD surveys: What do Germans think about Ukraine and defence policy? . ISD. (2024, June 12).https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/isd-surveys-what-do-germans-think-about-ukraine-defence-policy/

[4] The berlin pulse 2024/25. Stiftung. (n.d.).https://koerber-stiftung.de/en/projects/the-berlin-pulse/2024-25/

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.