It’s time to get serious about winning this 10-year war

We Ukrainians are bemused by all the current talk of a two-year war. This war has been with us for 10 long years.

Of course, the scale of suffering inflicted on the Ukrainian people by Russia’s criminal invasion has dramatically increased over the past two years, but the international narrative around the ‘two-year anniversary’ is dangerously misguided.

That mistaken perception is preventing sound analysis of the errors made since 2014, analysis that should trigger an urgent, result-driven discussion on how to move forward now to ensure the security of Ukraine, the rest of Europe and the wider democratic world.

Many in the West are still in ‘lost-in-translation’ mode, unable to fully comprehend the significance of events in Ukraine over the past decade.

Continued failure to correctly assess the global implications of Russia’s 10-year war is fuelling complacency and inaction which, unless remedied quickly, will have grave consequences well beyond the borders of Ukraine.

The West must acknowledge that many of its assumptions about Russia and its regime were wrong.

In 2014, the absence any robust Western reaction to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas massively emboldened Vladimir Putin. The lack of clarity in communications with Russia and the failure to take – or even credibly signal – effective action has led us to where we are today.

Those failings have been well perceived by other players, including China.

After 10 years of war and two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the West still seems unable to grasp that Russia can be strategically defeated. Nor can it define what must be done to ensure that outcome.

This does not look like creative or constructive ambiguity. It looks like weakness.

The ambiguous response, rather than giving the West the space for flexible diplomatic manoeuvring, simply puts it in a position of weakness. You cannot talk to autocracies from that position. It’s a lost cause from the start.

Furthermore, the West has been unable to state firmly that restoring the principles of international law is a cast-iron policy goal, not merely a statement of political correctness. It is inevitable that goals evolve over the course of a long war, but there must be clear benchmarks on what is non-negotiable with Russia.

The West, and many non-Western countries, have given support to help Ukraine avoid defeat in this war, but not enough for Ukraine to win, whatever definition of victory is taken. This could become a long-term problem, undermining the image of a united West that makes solidarity a top priority.

Sanctions implementation is a blatant example of how the West could do more.

Ineffective implementation and a lack of leverage with non-Western countries, has allowed Russia to circumvent sanctions using parallel imports via neighbouring nations.

Open-source statistical data has shown growth in certain Western exports to countries in central Asia growing over 20-fold since 2022. It’s pretty clear where those goods are going. Yet two years since the full-scale invasion, no clear action is being taken to halt the flow of Western goods into Russia via places such as Kyrgyzstan.

That unwillingness to play hardball is costing Ukrainian lives.

It is also time for the West to wake up to the need to treat defence-related production as a critical part of policy making, rather than just a business model.

This is not about moving to a wartime economy, but Western nations need to consider giving high priority to security-related R&D, production, and training. The ability to supply Ukraine with what we need is an issue of credibility for the West and especially for Europe, but this goes beyond Ukraine. Russia’s war should be a warning for democracies everywhere on the need to boost their own defence capabilities.

Europeans are taking on a greater role in helping Ukraine’s defence needs, but sadly this seems be driven mostly by growing uncertainty over continued US support. Regardless of the latest moves, it won’t be possible for Europe to completely substitute for US assistance over any reasonable time frame.

Europe’s inability to deliver the necessary assistance to a democratic neighbour under attack, makes clear that Europe needs strategic leadership, rather than strategic autonomy. Russia’s war on Ukraine provides an opportunity for Europe to start working on that, making the Zeitenwende a reality rather than a declaration.

Western powers must also agree that the future security model for Ukraine can’t be some vague ‘special arrangement’ that again leaves it languishing in grey-zone uncertainty.

Instead, on the path to NATO membership, Ukraine should be part of a European model. That includes integrating Ukraine in European and Western strategic thinking as an indispensable part of strategic deterrence against the threat of further Russian aggression.

Any new security model for the West will be impossible without resolving two key issues: security for Ukraine and renewed deterrence on the basis of shared US-European strategic leadership. Discussion on NATO’s 2% defence spending targets is just a small part of that ambitious exercise.

Finally, Europe must overcome its cumbersome and bureaucratic way of addressing security. That does not mean avoiding much-needed democratic checks and balances, but it has to put security first.

Prosperity and comfort can be guaranteed only by making security the number-one priority.

It is time for Europe and the West to show that they are seriously committed to Ukrainian victory. What’s at stake is not just the future of Ukraine, but the future of Europe and the democratic West.

The challenges for us all are are great and the time for response is now.

This article is part of Friends of Europe’s Ukraine Initiative series, find out more here. The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.