Ownership and mutual benefits, a trade-off? Lessons from Rwanda’s philosophy of ‘Agaciro’ for Team Europe

On its second anniversary last December, the European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative reached an important milestone with the inauguration of BioNTech’s mRNA vaccine manufacturing facility in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The EU has been supporting its construction since June 2022 under the Team Europe Initiative on Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines, and Health Technologies in Africa (MAV+), which intends to facilitate access to essential health products on the continent.

For Africa, a continent currently importing 99% of its vaccines and 95% of its medicines, with a 25% share consumption of globally produced vaccines, the site’s construction has clear benefits and aligns strongly with the health and nutrition goals set out in the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063. For Europe, the project promotes the production and distribution of Western-led vaccines across the continent and allows for image recovery in Africa after its legacy of ‘vaccine nationalism’ during the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, as the site targets development objectives and geopolitical priorities shared by both the EU and the AU alike, it seems like a textbook example of what a ‘mutually beneficial partnership’ between Europe and Africa should look like.

Does this mean all Global Gateway and Team Europe Initiatives are equally balanced to the benefit of both partners? Not necessarily. First, the EU’s recent shift in narrative towards achieving ‘mutual benefits’ in development cooperation emphasises the promotion of its own self-interests, which creates tension with its long-standing commitment to promoting partner ownership. Second, rather than serving as the norm, Rwanda is exceptionally successful in retaining national ownership in international development cooperation, a virtue embodied in its philosophy of dignity or ‘Agaciro’. Moving forward, the Global Gateway should provide its African partners with more institutional guarantees for ownership, enabling a more equal partnership where countries less resistant to pressure from donors enjoy this same sense of dignity.

Why is there tension between the narrative on ‘mutual benefits’ and commitment to ‘ownership’?

The narrative on ‘mutual benefits’ is a central part of the Global Gateway strategy, yet the term was not coined by the EU. Originating from a UN Conference on South-South Cooperation (SSC), it was initially used to underscore the latter’s dedication to equality and win-win outcomes compared to the dominant North-South cooperation dynamic between donors and recipients. In a multi-polar world where countless newly emerging international actors have expanded Africa’s pool of partnerships beyond conditional aid, the EU was pressured to adapt its approach in a similar fashion. By emphasising ‘mutual benefits’, the EU now acknowledges the self-interests behind its development cooperation, rather than presenting its endeavours as merely responding to the economic needs of its partners. Although there is no harm in acknowledging these interests, this shift of narrative seems to coincide with a trend of decreasing commitment to partner country ownership in EU development cooperation, a dysfunction overshadowed by its sugar-coated formulation.

Commitments to ownership have been part of the EU’s pledge for a balanced partnership with Africa as far back as the 1975 Lomé Convention, the first agreement to formalise its relations with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Officially gaining traction in a series of High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness, the Busan partnership agreement’s definition of ownership reads that partnerships for development can only succeed “if led by developing countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs.” To this end, one of the Convention’s key elements was the establishment and co-management of the European Development Fund (EDF), involving dialogue between and sign-off by both the Commission and the partner government on all projects. A ‘National Authorizing Officer’, appointed for each ACP state, would represent it in all operations financed from the EDF. If properly adhered to and further committed to, such arrangements could guarantee at least a certain degree of partner country ownership.

Regrettably, however, a gradual process saw the decay of commitment to this principle throughout the different EU-ACP agreements. Reviewing the actual practice of co-management from Lomé between 1975-2000 to Cotonou from 2000-2020, an ECDPM report of 2016 indicates that the EU became increasingly assertive in managing EDF funds at the national level, and in doing so, increasingly pushed to address its own cooperation priorities. With the EDF now merged into the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), these funds have been fully integrated into the EU budget, effectively getting rid of the formal obligation to co-manage funds altogether.

Already made apparent from its first pages, the Post-Cotonou or Samoa agreement continues this imbalance. The agreement starts by stating its devotion to generating mutual benefits, followed up by declaring its commitment to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Climate Agreement, and a set of objectives starting with the promotion of the EU’s fundamental values before mentioning the need to address the human and social development in partner countries. Again, while commitments to achieving shared interests and contributing to the global SDG strategy are elements to be celebrated, European priorities seem prominent, while reference to partner ownership in the agreement is reduced to the mere promise of an “early, continuous and inclusive dialogue.”

Thus far, this promise does not seem to have uniformly translated into practice. Studying two of Global Gateway’s Team Europe Initiatives in Tanzania shows how their focal points were decided upon prior to consultations with the partner country, with several European diplomats labelling only one to be strongly aligned with its national development strategy. An early assessment of several other TEIs by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) equally shows inconsistencies in the level of ownership between initiatives, without dismissing the ability of partner countries to take ownership at a later stage. Important to note, however, is that the initiatives deemed most successful are those in which dedicated efforts were made to partner country priorities, one of which being the aforementioned TEI MAV+ in Rwanda.

What makes Rwanda so successful in retaining national ownership?

Academic literature on development ownership in Rwanda points to a number of explanatory factors, under which its well-established national aid architecture, low levels of corruption and general efficiency in policymaking and implementation. Its high commitment to development is reflected both in its long-term strategies of Vision2020 and Vision2050, as well as its medium-term implementation instruments such as the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2013-2018) and the National Strategy of Transformation (2017-2024). Others also refer to Rwanda’s distinct use of so-called ‘home-grown solutions’ built on the country’s history and culture to respond to its contemporary economic and societal challenges. In the list of renowned mechanisms such as the ‘Gacaca’ courts, ‘Umuganda’ community service and ‘Imihigo’ performance contracts holding government bodies accountable for delivery on their Vision2050 commitments, the lesser known ‘Agaciro’ development fund embodies the philosophy behind Rwanda’s insistence on retaining national ownership.

‘Agaciro’, meaning ‘dignity’ or ‘self-worth’ in Kinyarwanda, is a Rwandan home-grown concept and philosophy firmly rooted in its pre-colonial past. In 2012, the term was re-invigorated through the creation of the Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF), a sovereign wealth fund-collecting public savings to achieve self-reliance in the country’s journey towards sustainable socio-economic development. In line with this philosophy, Rwanda has continuously managed to successfully create policy space for itself, insisting on its own agenda and priority issues rather than succumbing to threats of fund withdrawal by unfavourable donors. One example is the Rwandan government’s continuation of its rural resettlement programme ‘Imidugudu’, a policy resisted by donors due to human rights concerns, but domestically deemed necessary to address the mass return of refugees in its post-genocide peacebuilding efforts. However, such resistance does not hamper discussion on mutually beneficial topics, as donor representatives notice a genuine interest among Rwandans to discuss politically non-sensitive issues such as environmental matters.

All in all, it must be admitted that despite offering some economic relief – managing to collect 7bn RwF ($5.5mn) in only its first few weeks, mounting up to 23.7bn RwF ($18.6mn) two years later – the AgDF’s budget does not weigh up against the financial burden of serious potential losses of funding, especially for a country currently still highly dependent on aid. Rather than stressing its strength in numbers, the power of Agaciro lies in the spirit behind it. By coming together to collectively resist donor involvement and external political pressure, the country is able to preserve its dignity and fully commit to its self-established development strategy.

Lessons from Agaciro in balancing ownership and mutual benefits

The spirit behind ‘Agaciro’ could serve as a point of reflection for the EU’s approach to ownership in development cooperation. While European attempts to build an equal partnership with Africa seem to keep falling short – proven again by the threat of underlying motives behind its narrative on fostering ‘mutual benefits’ – those in a position to resist are forced to take matters into their own hands. Not only are these developments contradictory to the EU’s self-proclaimed devotion to balance out their partnership, but they also risk creating hurdles for partners to pursue the development plan set out for them, by them. Whether or not the ‘mutual benefits’ narrative continues, the EU should re-introduce the institutional guarantees for ownership and seriously commit to upholding them for all partners moving forward. In any case, the Global Gateway Initiative can only be truly mutually beneficial if its projects are, at the very least, co-led by its partners. In line with the spirit of ‘Agaciro’, such commitments would allow partners to preserve their dignity in pursuing sustainable socio-economic development, while the EU can continue its newfound commitment to realism in admitting its pursuit of self-interests.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.