The evolving dynamics of research and innovation engagement between the EU and China

The past two decades have seen the European Union and China shape their relations in a number of strategic areas from trade to climate change. The leaders of both sides reiterated their commitment to engagement at the latest EU-China Summit that took place on 7 December 2023. Yet only recently has an area historically less visible from a geopolitical point of view strongly come back to the fore, namely research and innovation (R&I). This is a vast policy area that covers cooperation between the EU and China in matters of science, technology and innovation. It is an area of shared competence between the EU and its member states.

For a long time, China’s leadership has been aware of the strategic importance that scientific and technological prowess represents. President Xi has reiterated in several speeches that “science and technology is indeed the primary productive force”,[1] that “only by mastering crucial core technologies with our own hands can we truly seize the initiative in competition and development, and fundamentally safeguard our national economic security, national security and security in other areas”,[2] and that “sci-tech self-reliance and self-strengthening should always be considered a strategic support for national development.”[3] China seeks to win the current technological competition. The country’s degree of commitment is reflected in metrics such as the level of R&D investment and by its ability to surpass the United States in the number of most cited papers, an important measure of research impact. Based on World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) data from 2022, China also filed the most patent applications.[4]

Since the EU and China signed their scientific and technological cooperation agreement in 1998, the EU has maintained a position of openness towards engagement with China in R&I. This position was linked to the predominant idea at the time that bolstering China’s economic and scientific potential through cooperation would ultimately lead to an increasing level of alignment.

A comprehensive update of policy narratives took place in 2019 with the publication of the ‘EU-China: A Strategic Outlook’ joint communication, in which China was defined simultaneously as a partner, a competitor in pursuit of technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.

In addition to key geopolitical events and China’s positioning in these events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a series of other state-agnostic documents further reinforced the call for a policy readjustment, namely the 2021 communication on the ‘Global Approach to Research and Innovation’, calling for the need to preserve openness in international R&I cooperation while promoting reciprocity and a level playing field underpinned by fundamental R&I values, and the ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ of June 2023, which is based on a combination of actions aimed at promoting the EU’s competitiveness, protecting it from economic security risks and partnering with the broadest range of countries who share the EU’s concerns or interests.

From the very beginning of this shift, the European Commission started changing its approach towards engagement with China in R&I by launching, in agreement with the Chinese side, the ongoing discussions on the ‘Joint Roadmap for the future of EU-China cooperation in science, technology, and innovation’. The aim of the Roadmap work is to discuss, agree and implement the framework conditions for engagement that ought to define our cooperation in this area and bring about a playing field that is levelled, reciprocal and respectful of R&I values and principles.

At the time, there was a perception that our relationship in R&I was fundamentally unbalanced and that we had to look beyond the conditions of specific joint projects and analyse the wider framework of engagement in which these activities were taking place to ascertain where imbalances lay and ensure that cooperation would be truly mutually beneficial.

Following four years of discussion with China on the Roadmap, a few things have now become clearer. Firstly, China’s science, technology and innovation (STI) regulatory system has improved in some areas but remains unbalanced, for instance, with regard to IP protection. According to the EU Chamber of Commerce in China’s 2023 Business Confidence Survey, 45% of respondents consider that enforcement of China’s IP protection laws is still inadequate. Forced technology transfer is still being reported. Another example is to be found in the area of open science and open access, in which access of EU researchers and businesses to a number of important Chinese databases has been restricted, –for instance, to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).

Secondly, China’s current focus on the achievement of tech self-reliance and the maintenance of a technological high ground in certain areas implies little appetite for rebalancing and openness. This is reflected in the very slow pace of discussions on the Roadmap. 

Thirdly, while the playing field remains unbalanced, a position of un-reciprocal general openness from the EU side is no longer tenable or sustainable, and this is why our approach has become more nuanced and transactional.

While discussions on the Roadmap progress, in line with EU Commission President von der Leyen’s speech of March 2023 on EU-China relations, in which she called on the need to de-risk our relations, we have started working on the re-modulation of our STI strategy to make it increasingly nuanced. De-risking entails analysing and assessing where cooperation remains in the EU’s interest while at the same time restricting cooperation in those areas where serious concerns exist vis-à-vis the strategic assets, interests, autonomy or security of the EU.

To implement the above, we have inserted state-agnostic safeguarding measures on our most sensitive technologies in the 2021-2022 Horizon Europe work programme, while in the 2023-2024 Horizon Europe work programme, we have included additional China-specific limitations on actions that are closer to the market due to the fact that little progress has taken place on the Roadmap discussions, especially with regards to framework conditions linked to innovation such as IP.

At the same time, we have an interest in continuing to nurture our engagement in areas of mutual interest. We do this through two jointly developed research flagship initiatives in areas such as food, agriculture and climate change. We keep working to further refine this new approach.

R&I prowess will define our ability to remain competitive and ensure our security going forward, but ultimately whether the EU will be successful in re-modulating its engagement with China in a truly mutually beneficial way will also depend on the willingness of its member states and its stakeholders to develop and sustain coordinated positions. Last, but not least, it will ultimately also depend on China’s readiness to engage and provide more rebalancing, openness and a level playing field.

[1] Let Engineering Science and Technology Create a Better Future for Humankind – Keynote Speech by President Xi’s at the International Conference on Engineering Science and Technology, June 3, 2014

^[2] President Xi’s remarks at the biennial conference of the country’s two top think tanks, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of Engineering, June 9, 2014

^[3]President Xi’s remarks while addressing a meeting with the members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the national congress of the China Association for Science and Technology at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, in May 28, 2021.

[4]https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2023/article_0013.html#:~:text=Applicants%20based%20in%20China%20filed,)%20and%20Germany%20(155%2C896).

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.