The second coming of Ursula von der Leyen, 2024-29

Ursula von der Leyen was always equivocal at being marked out as the Spitzenkandidat of the European People’s Party (EPP). She refused to stand as a German CDU candidate for the European Parliamentary elections. Retaining the broad cross-party confidence of national leaders was vital to her chances of being renominated for the Commission presidency. Her supporters in the European Council included French President Macron, a Liberal, and German Chancellor Scholz, a Social Democrat. In the formal vote by qualified majority at the European Council on 27 June, she managed to get Hungary’s illiberal Viktor Orbán to vote against her, and Italy’s eurosceptic Giorgia Meloni to abstain. Those manoeuvres undoubtedly helped von der Leyen’s cause in the European Parliament.[1]

Nevertheless, while it was relatively simple easy for the risk-averse European Council to renominate the incumbent von der Leyen, things were inevitably less straightforward in the European Parliament. As MEPs weighed up the baggage she carried after her first term, two issues stood out: some on the left disliked her uncritical support of Israel; others on the right opposed her advocacy of the Green Deal. Von der Leyen needed an absolute majority of the Parliament (361 MEPs) to vote for her, in a secret ballot. The rise of the right wing at the recent elections, and the decline in the Renew and Green groups, posed a real threat to her re-election. The more she curried favour on the right, the more she lost supporters on the left. Von der Leyen set about canvassing the groups and individual delegations with vigour. She has made many possibly contradictory promises. Her speech and political guidelines delivered to the plenary in Strasbourg on 18 July mattered, therefore, and was delivered with poise.[2]

In the end, her victory by the margin of 41 votes was in spite, rather than because, of her EPP membership. The fact that von der Leyen has had to fight for her job has won her a certain respect among political opponents. Her election bolsters the EU’s centrist pro-European political forces in all the institutions and accentuates the relative marginalisation of the far right and far left. By successfully surfing as a Spitzenkandidat, she has established that that very process, although much misunderstood, will be resurrected in 2029.[3] The European Council will again first consider the champion of the largest parliamentary party as it makes its nomination for the Commission presidency.

Building the team

Kaja Kallas is already picked as the Commission Vice-President and High Representative for foreign policy, to succeed Josep Borrell. Over the summer, von der Leyen will construct a team of another 25 Commissioners from those nominated by member states’ governments. In some ways, this is way too large a number for the Commission, whose bloated size was already an obvious problem in 2019 when the bizarre job of ‘Promoting our European Way of Life’ had to be created for the exquisite Greek Commissioner, Margaritis Schinas. A smaller, tighter team would undoubtedly make for a more efficient and purposeful executive, less dependent on national capitals. But although it would be perfectly possible, under Article 17(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), to reduce the size of the college to 18 members, the European Council prefers not to enhance the efficiency, purpose and independence of the Commission.

Ursula von der Leyen is at her most powerful as President-elect, but she must operate within certain implicit constraints. The new Commission will have to respect gender and regional balance, as well as a reasonable share-out among the political parties. Von der Leyen will find it difficult to reject unattractive Commission candidates served up by national capitals. But she can — and will — exercise to the full her powers of patronage by promoting those she likes to important jobs and by demoting those she likes less. In doling out Commission portfolios, she will be subject to constant pressure from member state governments, some of which (but not all) deem it very important to have their national Commissioner in a prestigious or opportunistic role. She is bound to learn from her bad mistake in 2019 when she allocated the enlargement portfolio to Orbán’s Commission candidate, the nationalist Olivér Várhelyi. She can also hope that the European Parliament may continue the winnowing process in the autumn by reshuffling some portfolios when it auditions each individual Commissioner-elect.

Need for security

Success in the EU’s current battles against hostile populist and nationalist forces will be much assisted by providing at the top of the institutions plenty of evidence of stable, competent and effective government. Here von der Leyen’s second Commission will take pride of place. The European Council, evidently badly divided, is to be chaired by the unassuming Portuguese António Costa, in succession to the underwhelming Belgian Charles Michel. Macron’s star is waning, as is that of Scholz; Mark Rutte has gone to NATO; Donald Tusk and Pedro Sánchez have ample trouble at home; Keir Starmer is not invited. Who is better placed than the Commission President, also a member of the European Council, to offer strong leadership?

What kind of Commission is formed over the next few months therefore matters a lot. Von der Leyen would be advised not to lumber her second college with a tag: her ‘geopolitical Commission’ of 2019 has not worn well. Strategic autonomy is still a worthy enough aspiration for Europe. An autonomous EU need not be too adventurous, but it must have its own coherent security strategy — even the more so if, as is likely, Donald Trump is returned as US President in November.

Three novel Commission appointments would be welcome. The first, which she has already promised, will be that of a Commissioner responsible for a portfolio of defence. As the Ukraine war rumbles on, the EU’s military insecurity becomes increasingly self-evident. The EU needs to focus on the development of permanent structured cooperation in defence. The Commission can take a strong lead in boosting investment in shared arms procurement and in creating robust functional links between the EU and NATO.[4]

A second new post should be that of an EU Attorney General. He or she would be responsible for advising the Commission on its role as guarantor of the treaties and enforcer of uniform EU law. A top priority for the high-level law officer would be to implement Article 7 TEU effectively, addressing breaches of the rule of law by errant member states. Another would be to escalate the fight against corruption. The post-holder should be a valid correspondent of the European Court of Justice and would oversee the Commission’s legal service.

The third innovation at the disposal of the President-elect would be to redesignate and empower the senior Commissioner at the top of the economics and budget team as the EU’s Treasury Secretary. This would indicate a direction of travel towards fiscal federalism without which the euro will remain resting on uncertain foundations. The main tasks of the Treasury Secretary would be to raise funds for investment in European public goods and complete the projects of the customs market and banking unions.[5]

So, three novel Commission appointments designed to imbue a sense of security among European citizens: military security, civic security and financial security. A von der Leyen presidency committed to sound government in the interest of European security should calm the public mood and command respect. A Commission that was seen steadily to be implementing ambitious EU framework legislation, notably to strengthen the internal market, combat the climate crisis and tackle immigration, could even become popular. Von der Leyen herself will need a busy work programme to avoid becoming a lame duck President, while being happily relieved of the need to be re-elected in 2029.

Widening without deepening

Lastly, then, how does Von der Leyen II grapple with the Union’s constitutional problems? Her first term of office saw no concrete advance in the constitutional evolution of the Union, apart from an inconsequential Conference on the Future of Europe, involving some citizens. In her closed canvass meetings with the party groups in the European Parliament, von der Leyen was rarely asked about her views on constitutional reform. Her answer, well prepared, was that although she will not oppose treaty change, she will not lead the charge. Enlargement of the Union, she says, requires internal reform, but she does not tell us what that entails.[6]  She would be wise to take the matter of EU governance more seriously, not the least by appointing one single Commissioner competent for constitutional affairs.

In June 2022 and again last November, the European Parliament triggered a formal revision of the treaties under Article 48(2) TEU, aimed at ditching most national vetoes in favour of qualified majority voting. By failing to react formally to Parliament’s initiatives, the European Council is already in breach of its treaty obligations.[7] Von der Leyen should back the Parliament if it decides, as it should, to take the European Council to the European Court of Justice.

The truth is, however, that enlargement to Ukraine (to say nothing of the UK) without deep reform will be a terrible risk for the EU. If von der Leyen really finds these matters too difficult to deal with, she should appoint a group of wise experts to deliberate and deliver well-considered options for treaty change. Mario Draghi might be prevailed upon to chair such a reflection group. Without the development of more centralised, democratic and effective institutions, the Union will eventually fail as a federative polity — no matter what happens to Ukraine.

[1] European Policy Centre, “The Union in search of leadership”
[2] European Commission, “Statement at the European Parliament Plenary by President Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for a second mandate 2024-2029”
[3] Verfassungblog, “Putting the Record Straight About the Spitzenkandidaten ”
[4] Encompass Europe, “The EU and NATO better together”
[5] European Policy Cetre, “A two-tier federal budget for the European Union”
[6] European Council, “European Council conclusions, 27 June 2024”
[7] European Policy Centre, “Towards common accord? The European Union contemplates treaty change”

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.