The US in Ukraine: lessons for Asia

The Australian government proudly describes itself as one of the largest non-NATO contributors to Ukraine’s military and humanitarian needs. It is, in fact, the sixth largest global contributor when measured in GDP terms. In Australia’s domestic political debate, the government is frequently criticised for failing to do more.

For many in the West, the high level of international support for Ukraine’s defence, including by Australia, has been surprising and uplifting. At a time of democratic regression, when was feared that autocracy was on the march and the free world seemed to have lost morale and sense of purpose, Western powers came together forcefully to punish Russia for its aggression.

The results of the unprecedented economic sanctions have been mixed, but on the battlefield the impact has been critical. Whatever the final outcome of the war, we can already say that the Russian military has been grievously damaged. It will take a generation to restore its combat power to pre-invasion levels.

This is overwhelmingly thanks to the heroic efforts of the Ukrainian people, but their success has been backed by Western weapons, military training, shared intelligence and diplomatic support.

Yet this solidarity has limits. Neither NATO countries nor Australia are making truly painful financial sacrifices on Ukraine’s behalf. Most European governments are spending around 0.5% of GDP on Ukraine support; for the US, the figure is 0.32%. This is not the behaviour of states who believe they are facing an existential threat from Russia, with the very future of liberal democracy at stake.

More importantly for Australia, the United States and its allies have indicated their refusal to directly confront Russia. This was made clear at the outset when NATO ruled out imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine because of fears it would have led to combat with Russian forces. Over time, the scope of arms deliveries has expanded from purely defensive weapons to systems with greater range and lethality, but NATO still insists its weapons only be used against Russian forces on Ukrainian territory, not beyond. It does not want to provoke a wider war.

The clear signal is that the US is reluctant to use force against a nuclear-armed great power where Washington believes America’s vital interests are not directly at stake. This is understandable and rational behaviour, but not welcome news for American allies in Asia, who are struggling to cope with a wealthy and ambitious China. While this is especially pertinent to Taiwan, Australia should also take the lesson to heart.

Of course, Ukraine is not a NATO member and does not have Australia’s history as a longstanding ally and one of America’s closest partners. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan can also claim to have a higher status than Ukraine in America’s hierarchy of foreign partnerships. Yet, it would be sensible for them to take nothing for granted; the US is capable of making ruthless judgments that prioritise its own perceived interests over those of allies.

This applies no matter who is president but will be especially relevant under a second Trump administration. Donald Trump has held very few positions consistently over the course of his public life, but he has been steadfast in his stated belief that America’s allies are exploiting the US, and that Washington should either demand more in return, or abandon them. In his first term, Trump’s ambitions in this regard were frustrated by his own senior officials, but no US ally should assume this will be the case second time around.

Australia has responded somewhat paradoxically. On one hand, Canberra has emphasised geography as the key determinant of security – Australia is prioritising its own region. That is why the government recently turned down a US request to contribute a naval vessel to the American-led effort to protect shipping against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. This suggests that Australia sees the need to do more independently.

Far outweighing such gestures is the AUKUS initiative to supply eight nuclear-powered submarines to the Australian navy. AUKUS is an unprecedented wager on American staying power in the Asia-Pacific region. The government has also agreed to station US bombers at one of its northern air bases and to host a rotational force of US attack submarines in Western Australia.

There is widespread scepticism in Australia about our ability to deliver on AUKUS, a project of unmatched cost and complexity. But Australians should also question America’s role in their defence. If the US is really committed to defending its allies and its place as the leading power in Asia, Australia will become ever more deeply entangled in Washington’s contest with Beijing, a contest that could lead to military confrontation. However, if the US stops short of such a commitment, as it has done in Ukraine, then Australia will need to think very hard about how to boost its independent defences.

This article is part of Friends of Europe’s Ukraine Initiative series, find out more here. The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.