Ukraine: the art of the deal – Is Europe in?

This #CriticalThinking article was commissioned by Friends of Europe, inviting members of its Ukraine Initiative Steering Group to share their insights and recommendations. It is intended to stimulate discussion and debate on Europe’s role in the current circumstances. The views expressed are those of the contributing authors and not of Friends of Europe.

“No one can guarantee success in war, but only deserve it.”  – Sir Winston Churchill

Churchill’s admonition rings loudly in one’s ears on this third anniversary of the war in Ukraine while looking into the abyss of “for as long as it takes.” Does Europe deserve success in this war? Does the United States? Certainly, the Ukrainians do, but our efforts so far did not sufficiently reinforce their courageous fight to achieve a clear victory on the battlefield. Our failure to set a clear strategic objective of victory by Ukraine over Russia by a date certainly undermined our collective efforts by not setting a clear goal that everyone understood.

Enter President Trump who has a clear goal: stop the war. Everyone understands this desired outcome. To that end, President Trump, the deal maker, is ready to make a deal to stop the war in Ukraine. At present, Europe appears to be out of this deal or at least Europe is worried that President Trump will not invite it to the table or will invite it but too late to substantially influence the outcome of the negotiations.

Meanwhile, President Trump, the master showman, is ramping up the noise level, disrupting business as usual and setting the table with maximalist positions, as he does, embarking on his renewed effort to win the greatest geopolitical contest of our age not against Russia, but versus China. What President Trump believes to be in the interest of the US is his priority. It’s no coincidence, therefore, that Prime Minister Modi of India had a very successful visit to Washington in the run up to all this. In the de facto multipolar world that emerged during the last US administration, President Trump seems to have set out, based on the experience of his first four years, to ruthlessly reshape that world in the American interest. Europe, however, is America’s greatest source of income and the principal investor in the prosperity of the US. The financial reality of the transatlantic economy coupled with the raw power of NATO can surely be parlayed by astute Europeans into a leading role with the US in shaping the global vision of the American President and in so doing, his actions. The first step for Europe is to realise in this context that today’s events to achieve a just and durable peace in Ukraine are part of a larger, and to Washington, more important grand strategy.

Given Donald Trump’s transactional approach to global issues of genuine concern to many whereby the US will only engage in relationships and arrangements from which it is the major beneficiary, how does Europe engage? Specifically, what role Europe will yet play in the process regarding Ukraine, or the outcome, remains a mystery as does the outcome itself; however, the role Europe should insist upon can still be determined by Europeans in and for Ukraine and globally. It’s up to Europe. How does Europe get in on these deals?  In the American vernacular it’s simple, you pay to play.

From President Eisenhower on, every US President complained about Europe’s lack of financial commitment to its own defence. Long-serving Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in his farewell address to NATO in June 2011 was unequivocal:

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence.

To its credit, Europe – at least most of it – is increasing its defence spending, more than 30% from 2021 to 2024, but it’s clearly not enough. Because of its stringent sanctions regime, Europe is already paying dearly, but in a way that may not be reflected in Washington’s balance sheet.  Transactionally, the US and European Union need to work together if the lifting of sanctions against Moscow is contemplated and/or decided together. The EU sanctions are even more far-reaching than those of the US. Ironically, the EU adopted the 16th package of sanctions on the same day as the US-Russia meeting in Riyadh. So, sanctions are one reason Europe earned its seat at the table. It makes little sense for the US President to wave the carrot of sanctions relief if the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada and other partners are not aligned. Sanctions were imposed for real reasons and should not be lifted until Moscow takes concrete actions to remediate those offenses. We cannot do business with or in Russia until Russia accepts a credible, just, durable and enforceable peace agreement in Ukraine and its compliance is tested during a prolonged probation period.

Another famous American adage says that if you play, you play to win. There’s no sense in paying if you don’t plan on winning. Herein lies many Americans’ objections to endless support for the war effort in Ukraine. If we don’t intend to win, why waste the money?

Three years on with victory elusive and a potential peace agreement seemingly predicated on the loss of a certain amount of Ukrainian territory, at least temporarily, what is winning? Security in the long term is the best achievable result, and we would now count that as a win. Therefore, the objectives now must be to preserve Ukraine as an independent, sovereign country linked to the West and to prevent further Russian aggression by:

• Building up the Ukrainian army into a real deterrent force.
• Deploying a European reassurance force.
• Keeping some kind of leverage over Russia (sanctions snapback).

To get in on the Ukraine deal therefore, Europe needs to politically and financially commit to this ‘win’ in the negotiated end to the war and to win the peace that follows. Any negotiations will no doubt be complex, often difficult, and excruciatingly drawn out as each side seeks to gain advantage and leverage at the table by actions on the battlefield and beyond. Therefore, the Ukrainian military, government and civil society need robust, consistent and predictable long-term support that is designed to sustain peace. Even now, by going ‘all in’ can we strengthen the Ukrainian hand in the talks by giving them the real capability to threaten Russian forces on the battlefield with defeat while demonstrating to Russia that our superior economic power will drain their strength.[1]

Recalling that our collective prosperity and way of life are inextricably entwined, Europe should act as the equal partner it has always aspired to be fully capable of delivering its share of our common efforts. Shaping and responding thoughtfully to official decisions through established processes in this way is far more effective and less stressful than reacting immediately to press conferences and tweets.

Here it is worth noting Secretary of State Rubio’s restatement after his first meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov of the US goal for Ukraine-specific talks as “a path to ending the conflict in Ukraine as soon as possible in a way that is enduring, sustainable and acceptable to all sides [emphasis added, Ed.].” While this meeting was the first process step toward re-establishing a US-Russian dialogue, it is important to note the next step in the established process was for Secretary Rubio to call and consult with his European Quint counterparts, the EU High Representative, and the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. It would seem normal diplomatic processes continue, despite the rhetoric, leaving the door for Europe open. How should Europe walk through that door to achieve its aims?

In May 2024, at Friends of Europe we published a thoughtful study of the question ‘Ukraine: cost of inaction – What’s at stake for our economies, politics and democracies.’ The recommendations reveal that Europe is well-positioned to take a leading role shaping and implementing a peace deal.  All of them are in line with Europe’s capabilities and interests from sustaining military support to strengthening economic resilience, from prioritising energy security to supporting anti-corruption and governance reforms while facilitating refugee return and demographic recovery. Expanding Ukraine’s role in European defence and technology would be for mutual benefit. Russia’s frozen assets leveraged for reconstruction would jump-start the effort and draw further investment. Most importantly, ensuring Ukraine’s EU accession process stays on track will be key to cementing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and guaranteeing a peaceful and prosperous future.

Europe’s interests are clearly at stake in this deal, but then, Europe’s interests were always at stake in Ukraine even before the Maidan protests. Nevertheless, incrementalism born of fears of escalation real and imagined emboldened the adversary to do whatever he chose in Ukraine whilst politics and processes devoured time and treasure in the West in the vein hope of forestalling an even greater disaster. At this point, it seems that what we are doing collectively is not working, how we are doing it is not sustainable, and therefore, something needs to change – and quickly!

To be sure, Europe has experienced a Zeitenwende and has moved mountains on energy, sanctions, financial support, and refugee settlement; however, all our efforts are so far inadequate to task for here we are. Now is the time to choose a better path or a new one:

“The hour of Europe has dawned.” – Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, 1991

In our common commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ Europe tends to default toward more multilateralism whereas Americans more often focus on effective. The situation demands both.  Therefore, to sit at the table and shape the negotiations in favorable ways we recommend in the strongest terms the following effective and multilateral actions:

Declare Europe’s strategic objective:

• a whole, free, independent and sovereign Ukraine;
• a strong well-armed economically developed self-sustaining Ukraine;
• a Ukraine that fully achieves its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration;
• a Ukrainian people who feel secure and at peace within a free Europe;
• a country and a people fully restored to their rightful place in the world.

Immediate action to make money available for defence, for investment in the defence industry in Europe, and a clear policy to remove the stigma on the defence industry:

• the EU should exempt defence and security spending from debt limits;
• the European Investment Bank should appropriately alter defence lending practices;
• the EU should use bonds to raise money for investment in defence capabilities;
• the EU should ease regulatory constraints on defence investments and create incentives for private banks to finance defence projects;
• increase investment in joint European military projects and better utilise the continent’s research and development capacities, to create a more integrated and self-sufficient European defence industry;
• urgent consideration should be given to unleashing a transatlantic defence industrial base to meet the urgent needs of Europe, the US and our partners.

Set and enforce a red line regarding Ukraine – we will no longer tolerate:

• war as a tool of state policy;
• indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population;
• intentional destruction of civil, energy and medical infrastructure;
• kidnap, rape, torture and other acts of terrorism against anyone;
• forced relocation of children and families to depopulate native areas.

Provide Ukraine the means to threaten Russian forces on their territory with defeat:

• the means to attack any legitimate military or government target;
• the permission to use our weaponry anywhere to win the war;
• all the war materiel needed to conduct offensive operations;
• all remaining sanctions options should be used against Russia now.

Provide for the reconstruction of post-war Ukraine to European standards:

1. the means, expertise and manpower to rebuild Ukraine;
2. the loans, grants and financing to do so and advocacy with others;
3. the full integration of Ukrainian economic activity with Europe;
4. establish a financial package to support Ukraine’s reconstruction similar to the EU’s COVID Recovery Fund.

Accelerate membership for Ukraine in at least the EU if not NATO

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” This statement suggests that the converse is also true: “Politics is the continuation of war by other means.” In great power competition, therefore, it seems that there are only two choices, to achieve our aims politically or to fight militarily. We have the resources, we have the rhetoric, we seem increasingly to have the resolve, but can we develop the winning political tools in time to stave off undesirable military outcomes?

The winning political routine requires a narrow focus on the coherent integration and timely application of all elements of transatlantic power in support of a winning strategy, as described herein, which will, in turn, enable a truly effective multilateralism. In the face of determined autocratic competitors, who systematically use all their elements of power, coordinated by design, to attack us in our most vulnerable places and at the most inopportune times, we have no other choice.  Any negotiating positions by Moscow are merely a continuation of war by other means and a means to the same end. Europe, therefore, must step up, step in and win.[2]

“Well, if you want a place at the table, make sure you come up with relevant proposals.” – NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

If Europe is to have a seat at the table, Europe must deserve it. Once at the table, what will Europe propose and how will it work? Security guarantees seem to be the most pressing challenge. To that end, the American questionnaire sent to Allies asked each “Would they be prepared to put troops on the ground in a cease-fire? What other capabilities were they prepared to commit to Ukraine to lock in robust security guarantees?” Some, the UK specifically, suggested deploying its own troops with a US backstop. The lessons of the post Balkan wars period of the early 1990s and President Clinton’s reluctance to commit American troops to that region offer a way forward for Europe to put troops into Ukraine.

At that time, Europe wanted a way to access NATO assets and capabilities, to include the NATO Command Structure, for European-led operations in the European interest in which American combat forces would not be involved. The answer was the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) in NATO in which the Americans would provide the strategic enablers that only they possess, for example, strategic lift and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. In this way, the US backstopped European military action. After the 1998 St. Malo Blair-Chirac summit and the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the EU, the Berlin Plus Agreements were negotiated to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities as well as American strategic enablers. All this is on the books, approved and agreed.[3]

Three options therefore exist as a potential solution for a robust on-the-ground security guarantee for Ukraine; options that provide room for manoeuver in the negotiations. First, given that no NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine is a very likely caveat, it is possible to send European troops under an EU flag via a Berlin Plus operation, which further ensures that all involved understand that both NATO and the US have ‘skin in the game’ and are standing by to reinforce the EU mission should Russia in any way challenge the implementation of the peace agreement. Such a Berlin Plus operation seems the fastest, easiest and most robust way to effectively command and control a multinational operation in Ukraine. Of course, the Russians will object on principle, but what they will really fear is the power this force puts behind the security guarantee to Ukraine.

The second, less NATO-heavy option, is also a Berlin Plus arrangement but one in which the European Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), on behalf of NATO and the EU would be tasked with the force planning and force generation for the deployment as it has to begin quickly given the negotiation dynamics. However, for the operation a European national military headquarters would act as the framework for the operation and the European force commander would operate from a multinational force headquarters forward possibly in Ukraine.

The third alternative involves using Article 44 of the EU Treaty, which allows EU missions to be delegated to a group of member states who in turn would organise, train and equip the operation as they see fit. Whichever option is ultimately preferred, the initial proposal should be as robust as possible to shape the negotiations. Finally, there can be no Russian veto over the force composition and mandate.

Of course, European political solidarity is the key to its credibility, but in this heavily contested election cycle both recently and yet to come, such a unified vision for Europe’s role in Ukraine and for the world remains elusive and adds to Washington’s frustration with its traditionally preferred partner. Nevertheless, the hour of Europe can dawn now if it rises to the occasion, asserts its power, and plays to win. In a world reshaped by President Trump, it may not get another chance.

[1] From the Statement By The Honorable Keith Kellogg Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Co-Chair, Center for American Security America First Policy Institute Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate 118th Congress “Open Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Conflict in Ukraine”, February 28, 2023.

[2] These two paragraphs are taken from “America is Back. Is Europe Back Too?”, Orbis, November 2021 by Michael Ryan and Valbona Zeneli

[3] With Cyprus in the EU and Turkey in NATO their relationship has proved a stumbling block to NATO-EU cooperation under Berlin Plus. Given the stakes involved here, both could be persuaded to permit its use.