What is China up to in Belarus?

The announcement of a joint counter-terrorism exercise between Belarusian and Chinese forces near the border with Poland last week coincided with NATO 75th anniversary summit in Washington. Western observers have not seen the timing as coincidental but intended by Beijing to convey the message that its alignment with Russia remains strong at the moment when NATO leaders in Washington were criticising China for serving as the “decisive enabler” of the Russian war effort against Ukraine. In his final summit press conference, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said that the Belarus-China exercise was “part of a pattern of authoritarian states coming closer together” to challenge Western security interests and the international security order by intervening in Europe, Africa and the Arctic.

What NATO will now be looking for are indications that China will build on this first joint exercise with Belarus to strengthen its cooperation with this key ally of Russia. Will it also supply Lukashenko with military technology, such as advanced micro-electronics, machine tools or missile components, as it is doing with Russia? Will it conduct trilateral military exercises with both Russia and Belarus on Belarusian territory? Will Beijing seek permanent bases or military facilities in Belarus? Recently, Moscow has relocated some of its tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. When Russia conducts nuclear exercises in Belarus in the future, will it try to involve China in aspects of these exercises in order to demonstrate the total strategic fusion of military doctrines between Moscow and Beijing? This would be a big step for China to take, given its past reticence about the way Putin has been making nuclear threats against NATO following the alliance’s military assistance to Ukraine. The Chinese do not want the nuclear threshold to be lowered or nuclear weapons to be bandied about in such a cavalier fashion. Nonetheless, because Belarus has now been fully integrated into the Russian military command structure and allowed Russian troops to invade Ukraine in 2022 from Belarusian territory, NATO will inevitably see Chinese cooperation with Minsk as de facto support for Russia. Chinese military activity so close to NATO’s borders, even if symbolic at the present time, will undermine in Western eyes perceptions of China as neutral in the war in Ukraine and its oft cited aspirations to act as a peacemaker. It weakened its credibility as a mediator by refusing to participate in last month’s Ukraine Peace Summit organised by the Swiss government in Burgenstock. What will worry the allies in particular is that the activity in Belarus was a land exercise. In the past Chinese military activities in Europe have essentially been maritime affairs, such as port visits and joint naval exercises with Russia in the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Maritime exercises in international waters and away from sensitive borders or the nearby presence of adversary forces are often seen as less provocative. A land exercise, by contrast, in a particularly sensitive area for NATO’s collective defence will raise a lot of eyebrows in Brussels.

The attitude of the Lukashenko government in Belarus will be interesting to watch too. Despite his dependence on Moscow, Lukashenko likes to portray himself as an independent leader who can run his own foreign policy. He has refused to put Belarusian troops in Ukraine (at least so far) and, in recent days, trumpeted a mutual disengagement of Belarusian and Ukrainian forces from along their shared border. Belarus has a stronger opposition to the regime than the opposition to Putin in Russia. That opposition has carried out a number of sabotage attacks against Russian aircraft in Belarus and railway lines used by Russian forces in the country. Last week, Lukashenko freed some opposition politicians. So he may be playing the Chinese card to demonstrate to Moscow his capacity for independent manoeuvre and initiative. At the same time, allowing the Chinese military into Belarus will increase NATO’s perception of the emergence of a new and potentially daunting Moscow-Beijing-Minsk axis. It is hard to believe that Lukashenko would have agreed to the exercise with China without getting a green light from Putin first. The capacity of the Belarusian army to do this kind of thing without using the Russian command and control structure and logistics inside Belarus is extremely limited. NATO will certainly not believe that the joint exercise in Belarus last week was intended to “counter terrorism “. This was the pretext frequently used by Moscow in the past to disguise exercises employing tanks, missiles and fighter aircraft and practicing warfighting capability and seizure of territory at scale (Zapad and Centa, the major regional exercises organised by Moscow every three years, are examples oft cited by the alliance).

Now that the NATO summit is over, the alliance’s intelligence officials and planners will be striving to identify China’s objectives in carrying out an exercise so close to NATO’s eastern borders. Was this a sign of Beijing’s displeasure at the way that NATO characterised China in Washington, delivered in the form of a pre-emptive signal just a few days before the start of the NATO summit? Beijing could easily anticipate that NATO in the summit declaration would publicly accuse Beijing of complicity in funding and supplying Putin’s war effort in Ukraine. The United States had already adopted secondary sanctions against a number of Chinese banks and companies involved in exporting electronic components and machinery to Russia and was encouraging European allies to take similar steps. In his press conference, Stoltenberg was particularly blunt on China, accusing the government of oppressing its people, threatening Taiwan and contributing to the death toll in Ukraine by failing to restrain Russia. There is a widespread perception in NATO that Beijing could stop Putin’s offensive in its tracks and force Russia onto the defensive by ceasing its assistance to Moscow. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reacted sharply to Stoltenberg’s criticisms, accusing NATO of “sowing discord” in global politics and “causing chaos” in Asia through its support for Ukraine (spokesman Lin Jian). Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a call with the Dutch foreign minister, accused NATO of a “Cold War mentality” but he did leave the door open for further dialogue with the alliance based on “mutual respect, equality of treatment and non-interference in domestic affairs”. NATO vis-à-vis Beijing has also expressed interest in maintaining a dialogue. Some NATO allies expressed their concern regarding the tough language in the summit declaration. Both Slovakia and Hungary stressed that NATO should not become “an anti-China pact”. But these reservations are weakened by the fact that both Slovakia and Hungary signed up to a summit declaration that was adopted by the consensus of all 32 allies.

Another reading of the Chinese presence in Belarus is that it is a reaction to the way that the NATO allies are increasingly integrating their security approaches and policies with the democracies in the Asia-Pacific region. On the final day of the summit, NATO held another productive meeting with the leaders of Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand. The United States announced that it had reached agreement with South Korea on a guideline that would commit a number of US nuclear and conventional forces, both onshore and offshore, to pre-assigned roles for the defence of South Korea. South Korea announced that it would double its financial contribution to NATO’s trust fund for Ukraine from the current $12mn to $24mn, but it was quiet on its earlier hint that it would send lethal weapons to Ukraine following its displeasure at the recent military agreement between Russia and North Korea. Still President Yoon announced a $2bn loan to Kyiv for next year. South Korea also received an air worthiness certification from NATO, meaning that its military aircraft are deemed to be fully NATO compatible and can be used in NATO air forces as well as for training and exercises. Prime Minister Kishida of Japan announced that Japan will conduct an exercise with NATO next year in the Euro-Atlantic area. He also called for more sharing of sensitive intelligence between NATO and the four Asian-Pacific partners. New Zealand signed an individual partnership agreement with NATO. There was also agreement to step up cooperation between NATO and the four countries on AI, cyber security, disinformation and climate change. However although some allies have continued to push for a NATO liaison office to be established in Tokyo after no consensus could be found in Vilnius last year, there was still no consensus in Washington either. Nonetheless, the obvious strategic alignment between NATO and the Asia -Pacific partners in Washington was a useful and timely way for NATO to demonstrate its relevance to Congress and the US security establishment in an election year and at a time when they are increasingly focused on China. A perception in Brussels that China is not only helping Russia discreetly behind the scenes but more openly sending forces to Europe to boost Russia and try to intimidate NATO will only accelerate the military cooperation between NATO and the United States and its partners in the Asia-Pacific. The debate between Beijing and the West will inevitably become one of “who is provoking who and who is reacting to who?”

This brings us finally to the issue of NATO’s likely response. In Washington, some allies mentioned the need to “re-possess” Chinese owned infrastructure in Europe (such as ports, energy and telecommunications) so that NATO would have full access to them in wartime. France, however, continues to insist that ownership of civilian infrastructure is an issue for the EU and not for NATO. There were calls too for NATO to assess in more detail the impact of Chinese investments as part of the One Belt, One Road programme which could be leveraged to aid Russia. The United States is leading these discussions and has suggested bilateral agreements if it proves impossible to reach joint agreements in NATO or the EU. Also, in Washington, three allies (the US, Canada and Finland) announced that they were forming an Icebreaker Collaboration Effort to build more Icebreakers to challenge China’s dominance in the Arctic region. The US currently has only two ageing icebreakers. Canada also said that it will procure 12 new submarines to operate in the Arctic increase its defence spending to 1.74% of GDP by 2030, and reach the NATO target of 2% by 2034 – the first time that Ottawa has committed to a concrete date. The allies also expressed concern at the rapid pace of China’s nuclear modernisation and its military activities in space. They called for an agreement on risk reduction measures with Beijing. Meanwhile, NATO will focus more on the defence of the Polish-Belarus border following concerns that China’s presence near the border could encourage Minsk to launch further provocations, even if Beijing insisted that its joint exercise was “directed against no one”. In the past, Belarusian border guards have pushed illegal migrants from Iraq and Syria into Poland, leading Warsaw to build a fence along the border and send troops to the border area to reinforce its border guards. Poland has now adopted an Eastern Shield initiative to increase its border guards from 6,000 to 17,000 (8,000 permanently on the border and 9,000 in a reserve rapid response force to be deployed within 48 hours). Poland is also working with the Baltic States and Finland on a drone border surveillance and early warning system. NATO also made integrated air and missile defence one of its most urgent capability requirements. Clearly as a result of the Chinese exercise, NATO will be looking more closely at the threat to its territory from neighbouring Belarus and how to intercept that threat. More Patriot batteries in Poland, the Baltic states and Romania will be part of the answer, but deep strike missile capabilities will come into the picture too. This past week, Germany announced that from 2026 onwards, it would accept the deployment of US Tomahawk cruise missiles, as well as SM-6 and hypersonic conventional missiles, on its territory, the first time it will host intermediate range missiles since the INF Treaty between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1987 eliminated this category of weapon worldwide (at least between the United States and the then Soviet Union).

So, in conclusion, the joint Belarusian-Chinese exercise will put three questions on to NATO’s agenda in the coming weeks:

1. Was this exercise an isolated event or the first step in Beijing becoming an integral part of the Russian-Belarusian military posture facing NATO in Eastern Europe? What part, if any, does China intend to play in these arrangements and subject to which command structure? Will China join the Russian controlled Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)?
2. If China is to increase its military visibility in Europe through more exercises, base facilities or temporary naval and land deployments, is there scope for NATO and China to negotiate confidence building measures, such as prior notification and exchange of information? Could these be part of the ongoing NATO-China military talks led on the NATO side by the Chairman of the Military Committee?
3. To what extent will a larger Chinese military role and presence in Europe change NATO’s own military doctrine and force posture in Eastern Europe, both vis-à-vis Belarus and Russia? At which level of Chinese military activity in the Euro-Atlantic area (scale and regularity) will the alliance need to react? Will this also lead to NATO establishing a more institutionalised relationship with Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand, as the US Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, was proposing at the NATO summit in Washington last week?

We will have to see how these complex and far reaching questions are discussed at NATO once the dust from the Washington Summit has settled and the alliance starts to prepare for its next summit in the Netherlands in 2025.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.