We need real answers to conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and keep an eye on potential ones in Asia too

On New Year’s Day in 1900, the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, hoped that the future would be good for rationality and children. This is certainly not how the New Year 2024 has started. Children have been around a third of the 24,000 killed and thousands more injured in the Israeli offensive against Hamas in Gaza since its beginning last October, according to the Hamas-run Health Ministry. In fairness, they made up a large number of the 1,200 killed in the Hamas attack against defenceless Israeli civilians on 7 October. In Ukraine, the United Nations Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, Martin Griffiths, has just reported that 14.5mn Ukrainians, or 40% of the population, are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Many of these will be children too; and this is not even to mention the millions of children displaced by ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan or Myanmar.

As for rationality, Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, inflicting vast damage on the Russian economy let alone on Ukraine itself and in response to no threat or provocation from Kyiv, certainly does not suggest that we live in a world where leaders put the wellbeing of their citizens and the improvement of their societies ahead of their own ambitions and psychoses. Ukraine would be enough of an example to question the influence of rationality on global politics; but as the New Year gets underway, military conflict seems to be breaking out all over the place. In addition to Ukraine and Gaza, which occupied most of the attention in 2023, we now see Israel attacking Hamas and Hezbollah targets in Lebanon as Hezbollah fires rockets into northern Israel, forcing the evacuation of many Israeli villages. In Gaza, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, shows no sign of stopping his military operations despite mounting international pressure for a ceasefire and the delivery of more humanitarian aid. Israel has also attacked targets in Syria. Meanwhile, the United States has struck targets in Iraq, and now Iran has fired missiles into Iraq as well, and even most recently Pakistan. This has caused Pakistan to retaliate by launching strikes against Iran in a surprising and dangerous escalation between two countries that normally have friendly relations. The US and the United Kingdom have struck over 60 Houthi targets in Yemen in response to Houthi attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, but the Houthis have tried to launch missiles against Israel and US warships as well. Turkey has also relaunched military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria and Iraq. The use of force is not confined to Europe or the wider Middle East. Africa still has its share of endemic conflicts with the war in Sudan and fighting between various armed factions in the DRC, Nigeria or the Sahel region showing no signs of coming to an end. The army in Myanmar has received a drubbing at the hands of separatist groups in the north of the country, losing control of entire cities, and Venezuela has recently threatened to invade Guyana over a territorial dispute, forcing the UK to dispatch a warship. In 2023, Azerbaijan demonstrated the effectiveness of military force in its lightning strike against Nagorno Karabakh, which forced the ethnic Armenian population to flee and led to the return of this region to control by Baku. “You may not like war but war likes you” is a phrase attributed to Leon Trotsky. Wherever we look we see a resurgence of war as states either unleash their armed forces to attack their neighbours or use them to threaten, intimidate or coerce other states to change course.

In “The Prince”, Machiavelli reminds us that it is easier to start wars than to end them. Wars are inherently unpredictable and develop in twists and turns that can make their outcome uncertain until the last minute. As they widen in geographical scope and intensity, wars can end up being fought for reasons that are different from those that led to their initial outbreak. Yet these lessons of history have not made war less attractive as a means to resolve disputes or realise geopolitical ambitions. Consequently, Western democracies at the beginning of 2024 are replaying a script that is familiar to students of the 20th century: moving from a mood of optimism that war can be prevented to a darker mood that war is inevitably coming and has to be prepared for. Already in 2023, the European Commissioner in charge of defence, Thierry Breton, announced that the EU needed to be put on an “economic war footing” and ramp up its capacity for military production and stockpiling of weapons in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Next month he is due to unveil his Defence Production Plan for the EU which will call for €100bn to be invested in this effort over the next decade. But just this past week, a flurry of new war warnings have been issued in Europe. The Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, citing a report from the country’s intelligence agency, said that NATO had between 3 to 5 years to prepare for a Russian attack against its eastern flank. She also called for a new long-term containment strategy to be put in place against Russia, which last year placed nuclear weapons in Belarus. The German newspaper Bild published a report on a classified document by the Bundeswehr, the German Armed Forces, outlining the scenario for a war with Russia in the next two to three years. A similar message emerged from a defence conference in Sweden where the Defence Minister and the Head of the Armed Forces both called upon the government to get Swedish society ready for a war with Russia in the same timeframe. Unsurprisingly, they were accused of alarmism by many members of parliament and the media. In the UK, the then defence secretary, Grant Schapps, delivered a speech at Lancaster House, in which he warned of wars involving Russia, China, Iran and North Korea and urged all NATO members to meet their commitment to devote a minimum of 2% of GDP to defence.

This environment, in which the upsurge of armed conflict is also provoking war scares and pessimism about even more destructive conflicts on our own territory in the near future, is confronting European diplomats with some tough questions that need urgent but also serious answers.

In the first place,what to do about Ukraine? Much of the discussion towards the end of 2023 revolved around the issue of ongoing weapons deliveries and financial support for Kyiv. Would Republican holdouts in the US Congress approve the package of the Biden Administration granting a further €60bn to Ukraine? For how long could Kyiv keep on fighting with the last US weapons package of $250mn from the previous funding authorisation? Could the EU move ahead with its own financial assistance package of $50bn despite Hungarian opposition and restock its European Peace Facility, which has been used to collectively buy weapons and ammunition for the Ukrainian army? At least, while these crucial decisions were still on hold, the UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, usefully popped up in Kyiv with a British weapons package of £2.5bn giving Ukraine President Zelensky a badly needed shot in the arm. Of course, if the money and the weapons stop flowing, there will be no point discussing future war strategy in Ukraine as organised resistance will collapse. Yet as the war enters its third year next month, European diplomats need to turn their attention to the question: how can Ukraine still win this war and what do we mean by ‘winning’? What is clear is that victory against Russia on the cheap and without real commitment and sacrifice is no longer possible. The Ukrainians cannot do it all by themselves with limited and haphazard Western support. The European Commission has just launched an exercise to assess which percentage of their military stockpiles EU member states have actually transferred to Ukraine – as opposed to pledges not yet implemented. We can guess that the overall figures, for a majority of member states, will be modest. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has been tracking arms shipments to Ukraine, calculates that these went down by as much as 90% in 2023 compared to 2022, immediately following Putin’s invasion.

So, what is truly required now is that NATO allies be honest with themselves. Is the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine such a Western security interest that they must defend the country as they would defend themselves; or given that a defeat for Russia cannot be achieved with the present level of support, is it time to cut and run and sue for a dishonourable peace with Moscow? In recent weeks European diplomats have spent a great deal of time working on a new peace plan together with Kyiv and bringing in Gulf states and Brazil, South Africa and China. Switzerland has now offered to host a peace conference this year, although Russia has not been involved in this process and is unlikely to show up. Yet it does not make sense to outline purely aspirational peace goals or to hold peace conferences if Ukraine is not in a much stronger military and diplomatic position. So, what is needed is a NATO strategy for putting Russia under much greater pressure. For instance, what type and mix of weapons does Ukraine need to make the Russian forces retreat? How quickly can a new Ukrainian army be stood up given the severe attrition that the current army has suffered after two years of high-intensity combat? Blowing up a single Russian warship in a Crimean port or shooting down a couple of Russian spy planes over the Sea of Azov may be a boost to Ukrainian morale. But it is movement on the battlefield that determines the outcome of wars; and this is what is lacking at the moment. If we are to encourage Kyiv to try another spring offensive, how can it incorporate the lessons from previous failures and be more successful? For instance, through a combination of attacking and defensive moves or large-scale operations in one area combined with harassing attacks elsewhere? Which aspects of the Ukrainian approach to warfare need to be improved, such as airpower, electronic countermeasures, long-range artillery and missile strike capabilities and sufficient ammunition to sustain the intensity of combat? What is clear is that Western sanctions against Russia have not been sufficiently successful in reducing Russia’s military production capacity, particularly in missiles. However, a shortage of advanced electronic components can significantly reduce the quality of those missiles. This is the loophole, at the moment, that the NATO countries need to close in 2024 by going after Moscow’s supply chain and financing arrangements. In short, Western policy has to move Ukraine from limited tactical successes – like forcing Russian ships to relocate from Crimea to the eastern coastline of the Black Sea or sabotage operations against railway tunnels in Siberia – to strategic success, which will change the course of the war and change the complacent assumptions of ‘Ukraine fatigue’, on which the Kremlin calculus is currently based. But this will only be possible if Europeans stop claiming credit for how much they have given to Ukraine compared to their neighbours, as Germany did with France last week, and really make the case for Ukraine as an existential security interest of both NATO and the EU. We have long been treated to the slogan: ‘as long as it takes’; but what we need to hear is ‘as much as it takes’.

In the Middle East, the questions facing European diplomats are just as difficult. So far, a wider Middle East war bringing in Hezbollah and another full-scale invasion of Lebanon by Israel have been avoided – although this may be more the result of the relative restraint of Hezbollah than due to astute Western diplomacy. Israel is also mindful that on the last occasions that it went into Lebanon, in 1982 and 2006, the ending was not a happy one. Israel has also struck Iranian supply lines and proxy forces in Syria but has avoided talk of an attack on Iran itself, although preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon now that its enrichment activities have resumed has always been a priority for Benjamin Netanyahu. Yet the entry of the Houthis in Yemen into the Gaza conflict can change the calculus. The Houthis are a tough nut to crack. They have refused consistently to heed public warnings from 12 Western countries, including the US, to stop their drone and missile attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The US and UK have launched air and missile strikes against 70 Houthi radars, missile launchers, and command and control centres in response. These have been far from symbolic and designed to seriously degrade the Houthis’ capabilities and deter them from further disrupting a vital economic sea route for energy and goods from the Gulf and Asia to Europe. Unlike the war in Gaza, the Houthis actions immediately threaten Western security by driving up prices and inflation and causing shortages of industrial parts in the EU economy. This is not good news in a year when the US, UK and others face a series of elections. Already, a Tesla plant in Germany has had to close for two weeks because of delays in procuring parts as ships are diverted from the Suez Canal around the Cape of Good Hope. As the US and others deploy more warships to the Red Sea to protect commercial shipping, they are becoming more militarily involved in the region. The Houthis have retaliated for the US and UK strikes albeit not yet in a major way. Unlike Hamas in Gaza, now totally surrounded by Israeli troops, they can still be re-supplied by Iran. US intelligence sources have told the Wall Street Journal that only one-third of the Houthis stocks of missiles have been destroyed by the US and UK strikes. After being at war with Saudi Arabia for several years until a ceasefire was agreed in 2022, the Houthis have become used to dispersing their weapons in underground bunkers. Calls on Tehran to stop arming the Houthis will also no doubt go unheeded. So, the Houthis will probably be able to maintain their threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and this will necessitate an international maritime protection force off the coast of Yemen for several months or even years – as was the case with the EU and NATO counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden after 2011. The EU is planning to send a joint force of its own under German leadership. The question is whether this international presence will be sufficient to persuade the big container shipping companies like Hapag-Lloyd, Maersk or Qatar LNG to transit via the Red Sea or to continue to go around the Cape of Good Hope. Will the US, UK and other countries be obliged to put forces on the ground in Yemen to extinguish the Houthis missile threat? What kind of additional pressure, or incentives, can they apply to Iran to rein in its proxies in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon? As long as the Western powers are unable to rein in Israel in its bombing of Gaza, their leverage on Tehran will probably remain limited.

This brings us to the situation in Gaza. The key challenge for European diplomats in the coming weeks is to convince Israel to come up with a credible military and political strategy in Gaza. At the moment, Israel seems determined to eliminate every Hamas fighter and destroy every tunnel and weapon. But as the Israeli army itself acknowledges, this total elimination could take months, even years, and as Hamas fighters wear civilian clothes and blend in with the local population, the Israelis will never be certain of ultimate success. The Hamas organisation will survive in the West Bank and Lebanon and Qatar, where many of its senior leaders are based, and will no doubt reconstitute quickly once Israel’s military pressure winds down. So, the total elimination of Hamas needs to be replaced by a concept of sufficient degradation to its command and control, training structure and weapons stocks, so that it is no longer able to repeat an attack on the scale of 7 October for the foreseeable future. What is this acceptable level of degradation and how to measure it? This is what European diplomats need to help Israel to define and agree upon. We cannot wait until every last Hamas fighter in Gaza is either killed or captured for serious humanitarian aid to resume to relieve starvation and allow the population to return to their homes and begin the rebuilding of Gaza. As the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, has just acknowledged at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Arab countries will not finance the reconstruction if there is the likelihood of endless Israeli strikes and continuing destruction. Israel and its international friends need to agree on a quick end to the Israeli military occupation, its replacement by an international security force composed of Arab and Western countries, a provisional international civilian administration to tackle the humanitarian situation and, in time, a competent government by the Palestinian Authority following the long-postponed Palestinian elections. Yet ultimately, sustainable progress is only possible if Israel accepts the goal of a future Palestinian state and negotiates sincerely to bring that about. Netanyahu has just firmly rejected that possibility, claiming that Israel needs to keep control of Gaza and the West Bank for its security. If that remains the Israeli position and Palestinian aspirations are perpetually denied, the cycle of violence is set to continue.

While Gaza and Ukraine have captured the global headlines in 2023, potential new flashpoints have not gotten any better. These are essentially in Asia and concern North Korea and Taiwan.

At the end of 2023, we had our first reports that Russia was using missiles supplied by North Korea against Ukraine. The regime of Kim Jong Un has sent hundreds of container loads of ammunition and missiles to Russia in exchange for Moscow helping North Korea with its space and satellite programme. This past week, the North Korean Foreign Minister has been in Moscow to continue this bilateral military cooperation. At the same time, the North Korean leader is stepping up his nuclear and missile programmes, having successfully placed a military spy satellite in orbit for the first time last autumn and launched a new intermediate-range solid fuel missile to mark the New Year. North Korea is also testing an underwater drone, which it claims can carry a nuclear warhead. Yet most alarmingly North Korea has stepped up its military intimidation of South Korea. It has shelled Yeonpyeong Island and cancelled military liaison arrangements with Seoul across the Korean Demilitarised Zone. Now, Kim is proposing to change the North Korean constitution to designate South Korea as a formal foe and has called upon his army to accelerate preparations for war. So, European diplomats need to take a fresh look at which international efforts can hold back North Korea’s nuclear ambitions after the collapse of UN inspections and the Six Party Talks over a decade ago. Russia and China will undoubtedly no longer be participants in this effort, but this is no reason for the Western democracies not to defend their interests where they can. Improving missile defences in South Korea, Japan and the western seaboard of the continental US is certainly a place to start, as is intensifying cooperation on deterrence between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul. Certainly, it must be made clear to North Korea that it will not be recognised formally as a nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as this would only encourage Japan and South Korea to seek their own nuclear weapons.

Finally, Taiwan. China has just used maximum pressure to interfere in last week’s presidential and parliamentary elections. It told the Taiwanese people that they had to choose between “peace and war”. Beijing sent military balloons over the island and its fighter jets repeatedly crossed the air defence identification line between Taiwan and the mainland. Chinese bullying was to no avail in the sense that the presidential candidate seeking the most distance from Beijing, Lai Ching-te, of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, won with 40% of the votes. Yet the party also lost its majority in parliament and 60% of the electorate did not vote for Lai and his policies. So, the standoff between Beijing and Taipei could either escalate or de-escalate in the coming weeks. European diplomats will need to be on their guard against any sudden worsening of the situation, such as a military incident at sea or in the air, that could escalate into open conflict. Close coordination with the US and Asian partners such as Japan, Australia and South Korea will be essential to deter China, as far as possible, and help to improve Taiwan’s capacity to resist a Chinese invasion – itself a factor in strengthening deterrence. This stepped-up cooperation, which could also be a topic for the NATO Summit in Washington in July traditionally attended by the leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, is all the more urgent given that China has also come close to military clashes in 2023 with Japan in the East China Sea over the disputed Senkaku Islands, and with the Philippines over territorial claims around the Scarborough Shoal, and Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The US, contrary to its policy towards Ukraine, does not recognise Taiwan’s independence but is committed to defending it. The recently resumed military dialogue between Washington and Beijing following Biden’s meeting with Xi in San Francisco, on the margins of the APEC summit, offers some hope that tensions over Taiwan can be defused. Yet European diplomats need to think about how they can contribute more to security in Asia. Simply de-risking by shifting the production of computer chips or chemicals to Europe is sound economics but not by itself a strategy. What more can Europe do to help Taiwan? How can it increase its influence and leverage in Beijing? Should the EU step up its military cooperation with its fellow Asian democracies, as the UK and Italy have done by building a sixth-generation fighter jet with Japan, or as the UK has done by concluding the AUKUS deal on nuclear propulsion technology and submarines with the US and Australia?

The 18th century English writer and compiler of dictionaries, Dr Johnson, famously said that second marriages were “the triumph of hope over experience”. For all of us worried about the future of global peace, a world at war represents the triumph of experience over hope. It is not particularly encouraging to have to begin the New Year thinking about how to better manage current wars, how to bring them to an end without making future follow-up wars practically inevitable, how to better deter the dictators still contemplating or actively preparing aggression; and how to ensure that our armed forces are ready to fight and win, our military production lines are ready to surge and our societies are resilient to withstand the shocks that 21st century warfare – even of the conventional variety – will inflict on us. Welcome to the way we live now. Happy New Year.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.