Japan: an emerging security provider in the Indo-Pacific?

The security environment has been deteriorating for the past decade and was finally shattered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The increasingly bullish authoritarian, revisionist and even openly imperialist states have been stepping up their efforts to undermine the rules-based international order. While Russia is pursuing its imperialist ambitions in eastern Europe, the next major blow to the rules-based international order could be dealt in East Asia.

“Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow, and the security of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is inseparable,” said Japanese Prime Minister Kishida at the NATO Summit in Washington.

At the Summit, former NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said that the Indo-Pacific “matters today more than ever” as its security is increasingly interconnected with one of the Euro-Atlantic. China has been helping Russia circumvent sanctions and supply it with critical military technology. It also instructed its army to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Meanwhile, North Korea has been stepping up the pace of its nuclear programme and can now hypothetically build 90 nuclear warheads. This January, the Eastern Asian country also tested a hypersonic intermediate-range missile aimed at targets in the Pacific.

Japan has been rising to the challenge. Despite its pacifist constitution, which previously prevented the country from having an army, and its historical below-1% defence spending, the country has been emerging as an important security actor. After years of legal battles, Japan has broadened the interpretation of its pacifist constitution, increased its defence capabilities and participated in overseas operations. Today, the country is preparing to spend an unprecedented 2% of its GDP on defence, developing “counterstrike” capabilities, which had been a taboo before, and deepening its international partnerships not only with the US, but also with NATO, the EU and even Ukraine.

The Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific need a functioning international rules-based system, where sovereign states stand united in their resistance against unilateral changes to the status quo. With the second Trump administration, it is likely that the US will prioritise its geopolitical interests over protecting the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, a term coined by former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe. Yet, Japan’s emerging security role could bring more balance to regional security- deterring China, supporting its neighbours, and increasing its influence vis-à-vis the US-Japan Security Treaty.

How to rebuild one’s army with a pacifist constitution

Following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan’s imperial conquests came to a close. Apart from occupying Japan until 1951, the American officials also drafted the 1947 Constitution of Japan, which succeeded the 1889 imperial Meiji Constitution. The document formed the basis of modern Japan. Article 9 renounced “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” whereby committing itself to never maintaining any military force and “other war potential.”

Despite the “renouncement”, the rearmament of Japan happened in parallel with Germany in the early 1950s as a response to the Korean War. It resulted in the establishment of the Self-Defence Force (SDF) in 1954 – AKA the Japanese Army. Apart from geopolitical necessity, the legal ambiguity of the Constitution, especially the interplay between Article 9 and Article 13, provided an opportunity for creative interpretation. Article 13 defined the “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” as the “supreme consideration” for all government affairs. It thus questioned whether the interpretation of Article 9 should be strict or broad. How could all these liberties be protected against an external enemy without armed forces?

The 1972 interpretation then defined Japan’s right to self-defence, introducing three conditions. An act of aggression must occur, no alternative means for resolution must exist and the use of force must be minimal. The subsequent 1991 and 2004 interpretations allowed Japan to expand its role in international peacekeeping operations, provided it remained non-combatant and focused on reconstruction and humanitarian aid. This allowed Japan to contribute financially to the Gulf War, participate in reconstruction efforts during the Iraq War, and support the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan through logistical aid.

The decade of insecurity and Japan’s new policy

In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. In 2012, President Xi Jinping was appointed leader of China, who shortly introduced an air zone over the Japanese Senkaku islands, which China had not claimed before, and reached new heights in tensions in the South China Sea. The country also started modernising its conventional and nuclear forces and leveraging emerging technologies. For the first time, China exceeded Japan’s defence-related expenditures in 1998 and, by 2022, it spent 4.8 times more on defence. Today, it has more naval and air assets and is expanding its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 missiles by the end of this decade.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un became the supreme leader of North Korea in 2011. Following the previous nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, he carried out subsequent tests in 2013, 2016 and 2017. North Korea also launched missiles over Japan in 2017 and 2022.

Xi and Kim Jong-un’s ascent to power coincided with the beginning of Shinzo Abe’s leadership in Japan in 2012, which marked a sharp shift in the history of the country’s national security. Facing these challenges, Abe’s government adopted Japan’s first National Security Strategy. The document stated that Japan could not ensure “day-to-day peace and security” unless it actively contributed to regional and global security. The principle of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” was born. Moreover, its National Defence Programme Guidelines committed Japan to strengthen its defence capabilities, followed by subsequent increases in the defence budget over the years. Still, its defence spending stayed below 1% of GDP until the end of Abe’s premiership – and the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022.

Despite Abe’s failure to revise the constitution – due to the public’s reluctance to revive Japan’s military might – his legacy rests on the 2015 legislation, which authorised its armed forces to participate in overseas combat operations in the name of collective security. In that case, the SDF would provide logistical support to Allies abroad or even take part in combat if alternatives would “endanger the lives and survival of the Japanese nation.” With this new mandate, the Japanese soldiers supported the UN in South Sudan in 2016 and, for the first time since 1945, joined a non-UN Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 2019 to oversee the implementation of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Age of conflict and Japan’s growing capabilities

Russia’s war against Ukraine marked a turning point in the deteriorating security environment. Abe’s successor prime minister Fumio Kishida published the second National Security Strategy in December 2022, recognising that Japan’s security environment was “as severe and complex” as ever since the Second World War. The status quo was being challenged by force, and the international community was going through “the greatest post-war trial yet and has entered a new era of crisis,” the National Defence Strategy also stated.

North Korea then accused Prime Minister Kishida of turning Japan into an aggressive military power; “Japan’s foolish attempt to satiate its black-hearted greed — the building up of its military invasion capability with the pretext of a legitimate exercise of self-defence rights- cannot be justified and tolerated,” an unidentified ministry spokesperson said.

The Second National Security Strategy called a spade a spade. China, North Korea and Russia are the primary threats to Japan and the international order, and something must be done. Japan would thus seek new approaches to protecting the international rules-based system – to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo and preserve a stable, predictable, free and open global system.

Japan defined “strategic approaches” in its Security Strategy to address this. On the menu are diplomacy, coexistence and coprosperity, stronger international economic order, and closer international partnerships and cooperation with the US. One of the key priorities is to build a better defence architecture.

The Strategy committed Japan to “a dramatic transformation” of its security policy and defence capabilities, especially through a 2% defence spending target to be achieved by 2027 – a target unprecedented in its post-war history. Japan would also have to strengthen its standoff defences and “counterstrike” or offensive capabilities, simplify the transfer of defence equipment and technology, and reinforce its defence industrial base and production.

The action followed the commitments made on paper. In December, the government of Japan announced an increase in defence spending to US$55bn for 2025 – a record-high increase of about 9.4% compared to the previous year. The government will also use this money to strengthen counterstrike capabilities, allowing Japan to strike deep into enemy territory.

When it comes to counterstrike capabilities, Japan’s Ministry of Defence is accelerating the deployment of the upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles, which is expected to take place this year. Japan also signed a deal with the US last January to purchase 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles. “There is a new Japan emerging, a more competent Japan,”  US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel commented.

Japan also eased its export controls on domestically produced arms. Having lifted its arms embargo in 2014 – a policy maintained since the Second World War – it further eased the rules in 2023, allowing weapons manufactured in Japan under foreign licence to be exported to the country holding the licence. Japan has thus provided the US with domestically-produced Patriot missiles and supplied Ukraine with essential non-lethal defence equipment. It indirectly contributed to military support by replenishing  US stockpiles of Patriot missiles, allowing the US-made missiles to be sent to Ukraine.

Moreover, the country has been deepening its cooperation with both the US and NATO allies. The 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid marked the first-ever participation of the Indo-Pacific Four: Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. The adopted Strategic Concept recognised that global security was deteriorating, and that the role of the Indo-Pacific has become more important than ever. Meanwhile, the cooperation framework with Japan was strengthened through the 2023-2026 Individually Tailored Partnership Programme, aimed at enhancing dialogue, cooperation, interoperability and resilience. The country has also contributed to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) Trust Fund to purchase non-lethal equipment for Ukraine.

New security provider in the Indo-Pacific

One of the foreign policy concepts coined by Shinzo Abe was a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” It imagines a region that enjoys peace, stability and freedom of navigation – based on the rule of law and freedom of pursuing one’s own interests free of intimidation. In opposition to this, China has been promoting a more Sino-centric vision of the region, undermining multipolarity and pushing countries to choose sides. However, with Trump back in power, it is unclear whether the Indo-Pacific will stay ‘Free and Open’ instead of becoming more “American” or “Chinese.”

However, the future of the Indo-Pacific will not be decided only by China or the US. Japan is becoming a major geopolitical actor, willing to take more responsibility for its own and region’s security. Before, if a US ship had been attacked near Japan’s territorial waters, the latter would not have been involved. Today, if China invades Taiwan and the US responds, Japan will likely support the US militarily. It already protects US ships and other military assets in the region.

Japan is also one of the largest defence spenders in the Indo-Pacific (trailing only China and India), and indeed in the world. However, it is yet to be seen how the country will finance its rising defence expenditures, given its sovereign debt, which reached 250% of GDP, and the potential for Trump to impose tariffs on Japanese exports.

Nevertheless, defence will remain a major priority for Japan in the years to come, especially due to shifting public opinion. In the 2022 government poll, 90.8% of respondents said that they had a good impression of the SDF, while 41.5% believed it should be expanded – an unprecedented increase. An overwhelming 84% of respondents also agreed that Japan’s security was under threat, while 78.3% believed that the SDF should ensure the country’s security beyond disaster relief. This reflects not only a geopolitical necessity but also a growing public demand for stronger defence and a more active role for Japan’s armed forces.

Geopolitical necessity and public opinion are shaping the actions of the government. To address its national security interests, Japan has thus been strengthening its defence capabilities while deepening its international partnerships. It is in the interest of the global democratic community to pay more attention to Japan and its evolving security role, which could potentially reinforce the rules-based international order and boost security from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific.

First, Allies and partners should reassess Japan’s security role and take into account its growing regional importance. The post-war pacifist approach is a long time gone, and Japan is already a major security actor. Second, Japan needs closer cooperation with countries willing to support the international rules-based order – such as NATO, the Quad, and the Trilateral Pact – to build joint capabilities and approaches to deterring threats. Yet, there will still be challenges in the form of normalising relations with South Korea when it comes to the latter and accommodating the US’ increasingly transactional approach.

Working closely with European countries would also allow Japan to advance its technological edge and diversify away from its dominant partnership with the US. In November last year, Japan signed the Security Defence Partnership with the EU, which reaffirmed the commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. It deepened dialogue and outlined areas for cooperation such as maritime, space, cyber security and hybrid threats, to name a few. The following month, in December, Japan also launched a joint venture with the UK and Italy to develop the sixth-generation fighter jets.

Finally, Japan’s own deterrence should be reinforced with stronger standoff capabilities, air defence systems and uncrewed assets – proved essential for Ukraine in defending itself against Russia’s aggression – as well as modern command and control systems and integration of emerging technologies such as AI. Partners could also play a major role in supporting it through greater technological exchanges, sales of advanced systems and joint production.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.