Sweden's future role in NATO

On 7 March 2024, Sweden became the 32^nd member of NATO, ending over 200 years of military non-alignment. The decision to apply for NATO membership was made almost two years earlier, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in May 2022. NATO membership had long been a non-topic in the Swedish political debate, where the view of the non-aligned nation as a de-escalating buffer between two superpower blocs was almost a part of national identity. However, the Russian invasion was a gamechanger for Sweden and Finland.

Finland and Sweden have for centuries been very closely linked, through a common history, and in recent years our countries have deepened political and military co-operation at all levels. From both Swedish and Finnish perspectives, it was crucial that both countries joined NATO.

The majority of NATO countries ratified Sweden’s application almost immediately, emphasising the strengthening of the alliance that Swedish (and Finnish) membership as security providers would imply. However, driven by motives seemingly unrelated to NATO’s strength and security, two nations chose to delay the accession process. Nonetheless, in March 2024, the Swedish flag was finally raised outside NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

So, what strengths does Sweden contribute to the alliance?  From a geographical point of view, the accession fills a blank spot in the northern area. Despite Sweden and Finland long being recognised as Western democracies and close partners to the Alliance, NATO military planning had to proceed without including their military forces or territories from the two applicant countries. Alternative plans had to be developed, in which Sweden, depending on the various scenarios, would align with NATO in the event of a potential conflict in the Baltic Sea region. This uncertainty is now replaced with predictability.

As an ally, Sweden intends to be a net security provider from day one and brings with it a well-trained and modern armed forces, which is developed and equipped for the northern part of Europe, for the harsh environment of the sub-arctic region and for the confined and shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. During the Cold War, Sweden built up its military capability to be prepared to fight a war against the Soviet Union, if necessary, alone.

Although the Swedish Armed Forces faced major reductions in the 25 years following the end of the Cold War, re-armament started in 2014, as Russia illegally seized Crimea. The defence budget is set to increase from 3.5bn Euro in 2015 to nearly 17bn in 2030. From 2024 and onwards, Sweden is among the NATO nations that will spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence.

Sweden’s strategic role in NATO is largely determined by its geography. In contrast to the Cold War era, Sweden is no longer a front state; however, it still plays a crucial role in the Baltic Sea Region. Three areas, in particular, hold significant importance:

Firstly, the Baltic Sea serves as the operational depth of the three Baltic states. In the event of a Russian attack on these states, Sweden will act as a staging area for reinforcements arriving from the West, which will need to be transported and sustained over the sea to the eastern coast of the Baltic. This role will be operationally crucial should the transit corridor through the Suwalki gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad be severed. Control of the Baltic Sea would then be a decisive necessity for NATO and an important task for the Swedish Navy and Air Force. Control of the Baltic is impossible without dominance over the island of Gotland, situated in the centre of the Baltic. Sweden re-militarised Gotland in 2018 and regularly conducts exercises with allies on the island. Control of the Baltic is also vital for Finland, with 95% of its supplies transported via Baltic sea lanes.

Secondly, the west coast of Sweden and the Baltic approaches, i.e. the Danish Straits, are important to control. The port of Gothenburg, on Sweden’s west coast, is the largest port not only for Sweden, but also Norway and Finland. Military reinforcements are also likely to enter Sweden through this port as well.

In the High North, Sweden, Norway and Finland form a barrier between Russia and the North Atlantic. Swedish capabilities to operate military units in sub-arctic conditions, combined with the well-established Nordic defence co-operation will strengthen the alliance’s defence of this important geographical area. Sweden also intends to contribute to NATO’s deterrence by participating in NATO Air Policing, the maritime parts of the Allied Response Force, as well as in the Forward Land Forces, by deploying a mechanised battalion to Latvia, beginning in 2025.

Finally, in addition to the hard military and geographical factors, Sweden’s deep roots in Western democratic traditions and our renowned commitment to peace-keeping and international conflict resolution will enhance NATO’s capabilities in these areas. As an EU-member state since 1995, Sweden will, in our new role as a NATO ally, continue to advocate for close cooperation between the EU and NATO, while promoting all of the unwavering fundamental values of our foreign and security policy. Within NATO, the EU, the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, Sweden will steadfastly uphold the rules-based world order, the European security framework, democracy, freedom, human rights and gender equality.

Sweden will make NATO stronger, and NATO will make Sweden more secure.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.