War in Ukraine: how to help David down Goliath?

When Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February 2022, not many believed that the country would have sufficient military force and resilience to withstand the invaders. Two years into the war, Ukraine’s army has demonstrated remarkable capabilities to counter Russia’s larger manpower and industrial might. This David versus Goliath struggle has become a humiliation for Putin’s regime, which bases itself on the idea of Russian ‘superiority’. However, if tanks and artillery are the stone that downs Goliath, innovation will be the sling.

Although Ukraine has been transitioning away from a Soviet-style army since 2014 and its defence industry has been expanding and increasing its capacities, still, this has not been sufficient. As it is often said, a small Soviet army can never defeat a big Soviet army. Ukrainians have been outnumbered by Russian forces by a margin of ten to one, which has necessitated further mobilisation, which in turn has led to a shortage of artillery shells, be it Soviet 152mm or NATO standard 155mm. In simple terms, it means that even with the Western support David will still have to find a way around Goliath.

The war in Ukraine has accelerated the change in the nature of warfare in the21st century. At the beginning, the Russian failed attempt to close in on Kyiv with its tank columns demonstrated a form of World War II manoeuvre warfare followed later by trench skirmishes at the frontline, classic World War I attrition warfare. What has changed over this period, however, is the role of technology. Drones, artificial intelligence and modern communications have provided an operational edge for the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield. This increasingly central role of technological capabilities in conflict has been called a transition to a network-centred warfare by some, where access to information and technology translates into an advantage in military might, helping a smaller power to punch above its weight.

The argument is that to accelerate its victory Ukraine needs to be able to provide a greater asymmetric response to a stronger invader, not only through more hardware but also innovation, technology and cyber capabilities. Ukraine has already demonstrated increasing technological sophistication with the launch of 1,300km long-range drones, as well as the extensive use of commercial drones, or the use of the contemporary operational communications systems, which provides the Ukrainian army with better horizontal communications, situational awareness and quicker decision-making.

Ramping up industry and pushing for innovation

The beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014 pushed the Ukrainian government to initiate a comprehensive revamp of its security and defence infrastructure. As the two defence industries were inseparably interconnected for decades, the cancellation of the military cooperation with Russia was a painful blow – with Ukraine running short on about 30,000 components for the production of defence products. The country has committed itself to import substitutions in order to discourage parts coming from Russia while increasing imports from the western neighbours and promoting domestic production. The import substitution policy was largely achieved by 2017.

It is important to acknowledge that Russian expansion also pushed Ukraine further in the direction of the approximation with NATO standards and greater interoperability. It added fuel to the fire with Ukraine seeking closer contacts with the West, the US and NATO, in particular. Apart from rubbing shoulders with CIA, which became essential both for Ukraine and the US to counter Russia, the country also sought assistance on how to become more resilient and capable of ensuring its own security. Through the 2016 Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, the country received ‘strategic advice’ on security and defence reform and more expert support on institution building. Some of the measures included strengthening the involvement of civil society and democratic oversight but also support for more concrete things like military command and communications systems.

At the heart of Ukraine’s reform efforts was also strengthening the public-private partnership. By 2017, Ukroboronprom, a conglomerate that includes various stakeholders of the defence sector, involved 21 regions and 447 SMEs in the production, modernisation and R&D activities, thereby creating over 200,000 workplaces. Today, it includes 500 SMEs and employs 300,000 people. The Russian aggression ensured a growing demand for defence products, also promoting an expansion of the industry and fostering more innovation. At the same time, it pushed the European Union to step up its game by including Ukraine in its March defence industrial strategy (EDIS) and also announcing the plans to establish a Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv to join the respective industrial forces and to learn from the experience of the Ukrainians on the battlefield.

Before the war, there were no mechanisms that could fast-track projects coming from the private sector and capitalise on the massive IT sector in Ukraine. As per the Atlantic Council, the latter kept on growing despite the war and only 2% of the respective businesses ceased their operations. Of 300,000 tech experts, about 3% serve in the armed forces and around 15% are supporting the country’s cyber defence capabilities.

The launch of the Brave1 initiative was a breakthrough. Putting together the Armed Forces, government agencies and the private sector, the new platform dramatically simplified the procedure for innovators – from three to five years to just a month (21 days is the current record) for a defence product to get from the pitch stage to full certification and readiness to be procured. In the first four months of its existence, 530 projects were registered, 220 of which were approved and received access to potential funding from public and private investors. As of 2024, there are three types of grants: €11,000, €22,000 and €44,000, depending on the mark that a project receives from the evaluators.

Innovation as a force multiplier

One of the former military units of Ukraine’s Armed Forces tells us a story about innovation. From a small group of soldiers, Aerorozvidka (‘Aerial reconnaissance’ in Ukrainian) turned into a full-fledged NGO or a ‘war startup’. It has been an advocate of the so-called net-centric warfare, which suggests that superiority in access to critical information translates into a competitive advantage on the battlefield.

“A small Soviet army cannot win against a large Soviet army. We have to evolve. We have to be smart. The main task of the war for Ukraine now is to transform from a Soviet army to a NATO one. You have to change the army to a horizontal one,” one of the members of Aerozvidka told the Guardian.

In 2017, they conducted a test of Ukraine’s first battle management system called Delta, which is based on the Command, Control, Intelligence and Surveillance (C2IS) approach. In plain language, it is a system that integrates all these words into one unified real-time monitoring and decision-making platform. Akin to Google maps, it allows military units to see friends and foes on the map, give and receive orders. The platform aggregates information gathered from various sources, be it satellites, drones, radars or your smartphone. In fact, the Ministry of Digital Transformation – well-known for its e-governance Diia app – set up the eEnemy chatbot, allowing citizens to report enemy positions, which is eventually fed into Delta.

The system had a limited use at the beginning of the war, when only a few military units used it. In February 2022, when a 40 mile long convoy was approaching Kyiv and, in 2023, when the Ukrainian army was retaking the city of Kherson, Delta proved its worth by quickly identifying enemy targets and allowing the Ukrainian army to take rapid and coordinated decisions when it came to neutralising the adversary. In February 2023, the system was eventually introduced to Ukraine’s army.

The Geographic System for Articlery (GIS Arta) – also known as the Uber for artillery – is another example. In a similar vein, the software stores information about enemy positions gathered by satellites, cell phones, drones and transfers it to the end-user. Akin to Uber drivers, the software tasks the closest and the most available artillery unit to a ‘client’ – an adversary – and a shot is carried out. It is rather a one-way dialogue – with no option for experience feedback. The system increases the efficiency of each artillery unit by reducing time for target acquisition and increasing efficiency.

Helping David to have the right sling and stone

Although Ukraine requires more international support to sustain its economy and feed its defence industry with 155mm ammunition, more artillery units and other hardware that saves lives of Ukrainian soldiers while, unsurprisingly, inflicting heavy damage on the attacking force, it is important to make use of the mushrooming civilian and military technology. It performs as a force multiplier, helping a smaller army to use its limited resources more efficiently while saving the lives of its soldiers. Under the current circumstances, Ukraine has been under pressure to innovate, for the sake of its survival, and it has scored many successes.

To make sure that David has just the right sling and stone to down Goliath, it is essential to further consolidate the defence industry, promoting the public-private partnership while also encouraging innovation and greater international support. Ukraine’s industry has massive potential as well as capacity, which is, unfortunately, not yet used to its full extent due to the existing financial constraints. International and Western partners should invest in Ukraine’s defence industry to increase its production capacities while getting access to its innovative environment, learning from the leading Ukrainian experience and, as it was described by the Minister for Strategic Industries, Oleksandr Kamyshin, getting their weapons “best-in-class battlefield tested”.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.